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This Article demonstrates that state laws vary dramaticallyin the
types of protections they offer. States may immunize health care
providersfrom a range of potential adverse consequences including

civil liability, criminal prosecution, professional discipline,
employment discrimination, discrimination in
educational
opportunities, and denial of public or privatefunding, among others.

Of these, immunity from civil liability, or "civil immunity," is by far
the most common proceduralprotection. In a majority of states, civil
immunity is absolute providing no exceptions in cases of
malpractice, denial of emergency treatment, or even patient death. In
practice, these laws eliminate patients' common law right to recover
monetary damages when they suffer physical injury as a result of a
health care provider's conscience-baseddeviationfrom the standard
of care.
While many scholars have examined the impact of conscience
laws on patient access to medical care, there has been no
comprehensive analysis of these laws' impact on patients' right to a
tort law remedy when they are denied care. This Article not only raises
awareness of the previously unrecognized breadth of protections
established by U.S. conscience law, but also challenges basic
assumptions about tort law's ability to remedy harms suffered by
victims of medical malpractice in reproductive health care contexts.
These findings create an important opportunity for further policy
discussion about the scope of health care conscience laws.
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INTRODUCTION

Tamesha Means was eighteen weeks pregnant and actively miscarrying

when she sought care at the emergency room at Mercy Health Partners (Mercy)
in Muskegon, Michigan-the only hospital in her county.' The doctors at Mercy
diagnosed her with a ruptured amniotic sac, but sent her home. 2 When she
returned the following day, she had a fever, was actively bleeding, and was in
extreme pain-but the doctors sent her home again.3 When Ms. Means presented
at the hospital a third time later that day, the hospital was prepared to discharge
her again, but she went into labor, delivering an extremely premature baby who
had no chance of survival and died within hours. 4 Later testing showed that at
the time of the delivery, Ms. Means suffered from a bacterial infection of the
fetal membranes and umbilical cord caused by the amniotic rupture diagnosed
during her first visit.5

According to Ms. Means's complaint in federal court, the health care
providers at Mercy never told her that her fetus would not survive the amniotic
rupture, or that terminating the pregnancy and extracting the fetus would reduce
the risk of serious health complications. 6 Rather than offering her the option of
termination, the providers at Mercy discharged her from the hospital without

1. Complaint at 4, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 1:15-CV-353, 2015
WL 3970046 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2015), aff'd, 836 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016).
2. Id at 5.
3. Id at 6.
4. Id at 7.
5. Id
6. Id at 5-8.

1258

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1255

informing her of the risks she faced in continuing the miscarriage without active
medical management.7
In so doing, the health care providers at Mercy may have committed
medical malpractice, and Mercy may have breached the legal duties it owed to
Ms. Means. A basic principle of medical malpractice law is that health care
providers owe patients a duty to exercise the same degree of care and skill that
other reasonable providers would exercise under the same circumstances. 8
Failure to follow the common practices of the medical profession constitutes a
breach of the standard of care, and subjects a provider to tort liability.9 Failure
on the part of Mercy's physicians, nurses, and other health care providers to
inform Ms. Means of her medical options likely constituted malpractice; and
Mercy, as an institution, likely breached its duty to Ms. Means.'
Yet even if Ms. Means could prove that the hospital or its doctors deviated
from the standard of care, she would be barred from bringing a malpractice suit
to recover damages for her injuries. This is because Michigan law, like many
states' health care conscience laws, creates a "conscience defense" to
malpractice which immunizes health care providers from civil liability, even
when their conscience-driven refusal to provide information or treatment
violates the standard of care."
7. Id. The main defendant in Means's lawsuit was the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB), not Mercy Health Partners. The USCCB, which was being sued because it drafted the ethical
and religious directives that bind all Catholic hospitals, did not dispute these factual claims. See Means,
2015 WL 3970046, at *2-3. Instead, USCCB, along with the other defendants, moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, arguing that it owed no duty to the plaintiff. See id. at
*1-3, 10. Means's suit against the USCCB was dismissed. Id. at *14.
8. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 76-78 (3d ed. 2014).
9. Id. at 78.
10. See Briefof Amici Curiae Obstetrician-Gynecologists in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and
Reversal at 6-8, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 151779) (describing the medical standard of care for previable premature rupture of membranes); Ben. A.
Rich, Your forality, Afy Mortality: Conscientious Objection and the StandardofCare, 24 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 214, 216 (2015) (anticipating "expert testimony at trial that adherence to the
prevailing standard of prenatal care for a patient in the clinical circumstances of Ms. Means would have
been to at least offer, if not recommend, prompt termination of the pregnancy"); Amelia ThomsonDeveaux, Bishops Afay Not Be the Crooks This Time, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/bishops-may-not-be-crooks-time
[https://penna.cc/K449-KDDJ] (quoting
law professor Robin Fretwell Wilson saying that if Ms. Means were to bring a suit against the hospital
or treating physicians in connection with her experience, "this would be plain-vanilla medical
malpractice").
11. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2019) ("A hospital, clinic, institution, teaching
institution, or other health facility is not required to admit a patient for the purpose of performing an
abortion. A hospital, clinic, institution, teaching institution, or other health facility or a physician,
member, or associate of the staff, or other person connected therewith, may refuse to perform, participate
in, or allow to be performed on its premises an abortion. The refusal shall be with immunity from any
civil or criminalliabilityor penalty." (emphasis added)); id. § 333.20182 ("The refusal by the individual
to participate [in abortion] does not create a liabilityfor damages on account of the refusal or for any
disciplinary or discriminatory action by the patient, hospital, clinic, institution, teaching institution, or
other health facility against the individual." (emphasis added)); id. § 333.20183 ("(1) A physician who
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While Michigan's law does not require refusing hospitals to justify their
refusal to perform abortion,1 2 Mercy had a religious reason for turning Ms.
Means away without treatment: As a Catholic hospital, Mercy was obligated to
follow the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops' Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (the ERDs), which prohibit direct
and intentional termination of pregnancy in all circumstances.1 3 Mercy, like
many Catholic hospitals, appears to have interpreted this prohibition as
extending to miscarrying patients like Ms. Means.' 4 Under the plain language of
the ERDs, termination and extraction of a pregnancy for the purposes of
preventing future harm is an intentional act, rather than an "unintended but

foreseeable consequence" of a curative treatment.' 5 Moreover, in cases where
the patient's condition has not yet progressed to sufficient severity, termination
would constitute a preventative procedure, not one intended to "cure . . . a
proportionately serious pathological condition of [the] pregnant woman." 6

Under the ERDs, Mercy also had a religious justification for denying Ms.
Means basic information regarding the possibility of terminating her pregnancy.

ERD 27, which lays out the provider's obligation to secure a patient's informed
informs a patient that he or she refuses to give advice concerning, or participate in, an abortion is not
liable to the hospital, clinic, institution, teaching institution, health facility, or patientfor the refusal. (2)
A civil action for negligence or malpractice or a disciplinary or discriminatory action may not be
maintained against a person refusing to give advice as to, or participating in, an abortion based on the
refusal." (emphasis added)).
12. Cf id. § 333.20181 (stating that a health facility "is not required" to admit a patient for
abortion, without specifying conditions for refusal); id. § 333.20182 (stating that physicians and other

health care facility staff "who state[] an objection to abortion on professional, ethical, moral, or religious
grounds" are not required to participate).
13. ERD 45 states that abortion (defined as "the directly intended termination of pregnancy
before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus") is "never permitted." U.S.
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH

CARE SERVICES 18 (6th ed. 2018), http://www.usccb.org/about/doctrine/ethical-and-religiousdirectives/upload/ethical-religious-directives-catholic-health-service-sixth-edition-2016-06.pdf
[https://penna.cc/7V3F-C834]. Only where the death of a fetus is the unintended but foreseeable
consequence of "[o]perations, treatments, and medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of
a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman . . [and that] . . cannot be safely
postponed until the unborn child is viable," are such treatments permissible under ERD 47. Id. at 19.
14. Brief on Appeal of Defendants-Appellees Stanley Urban, Robert Ladenburger, and Mary
Mollison at 30, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 151779) (arguing that Ms. Means's claim should be dismissed because it requires "a court to decide
whether it is reasonable for a Catholic hospital to follow Catholic doctrine"). The ERDs' general
language does not address particularized medical circumstances; therefore, any application of the ERDs
to a specific clinical situation requires interpretation, which may vary from hospital to hospital. Notably,
some Catholic organizations have argued that poor patient outcomes in cases of miscarriage
management may not have been dictated by religious doctrine; rather, they argue that these outcomes
may have been be the result of "misinterpretation" of the ERDs by hospitals and doctors. See NAT'L
WOMEN'S LAW CTR., BELOW THE RADAR: HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' RELIGIOUS REFUSALS CAN
ENDANGER
PREGNANT
WOMEN'S
LIVES
AND
HEALTH
13
& nn.76-77 (2011),

http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlcbelowtheradar2Oll.pdf
2UA9].

[https://perma.cc/56MF-

15.

See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 13, at 18-19.

16.

See id.
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consent, establishes that the provider must only disclose "morally legitimate
alternatives" to the recommended treatment.' Mercy's failure to inform Ms.
Means that termination of pregnancy was a medically viable option was
consistent with the ERDs, because termination would not have been considered
a "morally legitimate" treatment option.

For nearly a half century, scholars of law, medicine, medical ethics, and
philosophy have debated the role that conscience and religion should play in the
delivery of health care. Much of the literature in this area has focused on laws
codifying providers' right to withhold health care for reasons of conscience.
Specifically, the literature has focused on who should be protected by these
laws,1 8 what conduct should be protected,' 9 and whether and when there should

be any limitations on a provider's right to act in accordance with their
conscientious beliefs.

20

But these debates have overlooked a fundamental

issue-the question of how law protects health care providers who exercise their
right of conscientious refusal in the course of their professional practice. 2 1 In
other words, when providers refuse on grounds of conscience to participate in
health care services, what consequences are they protected from? 22
17. Id. at 14.
18. By way of example, the 2014 Hobby Lobby case drew dramatic public attention to the
question of whether institutions, or only individuals, should be entitled to conscience protections.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception
and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 303, 315-20 (2014) (raising
concerns about the doctrine of "corporate conscience"); Daniel P. Sulmasy, What is Conscience and
Why is Respect for it so Important?, 29 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 135, 142-44 (2008)
("[H]ealth care institutions have consciences.").
19. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What are They and When Should They
Be Accommodated?, 9 AvE MARIA L. REv. 47, 57, 60-61 (2010) (arguing that conscience protections
should not apply where the nexus between a provider's refusal to act and an objectionable medical
procedure is too remote, as where the provider has minimal personal contact with the patient for
example, "those who type [patients'] forms, make their beds, dish out their meals, and clean their
rooms"); Sulmasy, supra note 18, at 140-42 (analyzing the doctrine of moral complicity in cases of
"indirect[] facilitat[ion] [of] wrongdoing" such as the use of vaccines derived from the tissue of
aborted fetuses).
20. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, The CelestialFire of Conscience Refusing to Deliver Medical
Care, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005) (questioning whether offering legal protections for
health care providers' exercise of conscience is ever justified); Rebecca S. Dresser, Freedom of
Conscience, ProfessionalResponsibility, andAccess to Abortion, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 281, 284
(1994) (suggesting that public policy regarding conscience protections should be changed in light of the
"current scarcity of abortion providers," particularly in rural areas); Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte,
Duty First:Towards Patient-CenteredCare andLimitations on the Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious,
or Ethical Reasons, 9 AvE MARIA L. REv. 141, 182-84 (2010) (arguing that conscience laws should
not protect providers who refuse emergency services).
21.

See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Disentangling Conscience Protections, HASTINGS CTR.

REP., Sept.-Oct. 2018, at 14 (arguing that policy discussions about health care conscience protections
require a fuller understanding of how state laws currently operate).
22. Throughout this Article, these protections will be referred to as "procedural protections."
State conscience protections have both substantive and procedural components. The substantive
components speak to the specific actions, beliefs, or objections that are protected that is, the substance
of the medical provider's claim. The procedural components (the focus of this Article) address the
procedural mechanisms used to respond to the provider's substantive claim.
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While health care conscience laws vary widely from state to state, they
often include protections from civil liability, criminal prosecution, discipline by
state licensing boards or other administrative agencies, adverse action by
employers, discrimination in educational opportunities, and loss of funding,
among others. 23 However, there is scant scholarship critically evaluating, or even
acknowledging, the breadth of these legal protections. 24 Perhaps even more
surprisingly,

given the significant attention paid to tracking legislative
developments related to U.S. conscience law, 25 no empirical data exist on how

frequently these various types of procedural protections arise. In the absence of
such data as a starting point for academic analysis, contemporary debates about
health care conscience laws are necessarily incomplete. 26
This Article fills this gap in the literature by drawing upon an original
dataset of reproductive health care conscience laws across the United States to
present the first comprehensive empirical review of the procedural protections
established by these laws. 27 The research was conducted in compliance with
rigorous standards for policy surveillance and legal mapping established by a
leading institute of public health law research. 28
The aim of this Article is to understand the scope of these procedural
protections, with a particular emphasis on protections from civil liability granted
to individual and institutional health care providers, and any limitations on those
protections in cases of patient harm. The Article focuses on conscience laws that
apply in the context of abortion, but also presents research findings relating to
sterilization, contraception, and other reproductive health services. It
demonstrates that immunity from civil liability is by far the most common type
of procedural protection explicitly established for providers who refuse abortion
on grounds of conscience. 29

Further, the majority of conscience laws are absolute in their protections.
Such laws permit providers to refuse to participate in reproductive health
services and shield them from civil liability for their refusals, even when their

23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62.
26. Sawicki, supra note 21, at 15 (arguing that a better understanding of the procedural
protections established by health care conscience laws may assist both conscience advocates and critics
in crafting their arguments more precisely, and perhaps even in finding common ground).
27.

Procedural Protections in Reproductive Health Care Conscience Laws,

POL'Y

SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, http://lawatlas.org/datasets/procedural-protections-in-reproductive-healthcare-conscience-laws [https://penna.cc/2PLM-9HW5].
28. Temple University's Beasley School of Law Center for Public Health Law Research has
developed these standards in connection with its administration of LawAtlas, a project funded by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. For more detail about the Center for Public Health Law Research
and the methodology used in this project, see infra PartII.
29. See infra Part III.A.
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conduct violates the medical profession's standard of care and causes patient
harm. 30
This study is the first to conclusively demonstrate that abortion conscience
laws in most states create an absolute "conscience defense" to medical
malpractice. These important and original research findings not only raise
awareness of previously unexamined elements of U.S. conscience law, but also
challenge basic assumptions about the availability of tort law as a remedy for
medical malpractice in reproductive health contexts. When health care
providers' conscientious beliefs about abortion drive deviations from the
standard of care, victims in most states cannot rely on tort law to remedy their
harms.
These findings are cause for concern and create an important opportunity

for further policy discussion about how broadly health care conscience laws
should be drafted. In particular, they highlight opportunities for future academic
research, both normative and descriptive. Avenues for normative research
include policy analyses of whether health care providers should be granted legal
immunity from all possible adverse consequences of their conscientious refusals.
Researchers could also explore whether these protections should, as a matter of
policy or constitutional law, be balanced against state interests in ensuring that
patients who are injured by provider refusals are not denied opportunities for tort
recovery. Further empirical research might consider how the conscience
protections applicable in reproductive health care contexts compare to those
applicable in other medical contexts, such as end-of-life decision-making.
Additionally, researchers could compare conscience laws to other laws
protecting individuals from discrimination on the basis of their beliefs or
personal characteristics, like the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, and the Military Selective Service Act. 3 1
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a brief history and general
overview of U.S. law's approach to conscientious refusal by health care
providers. Part II describes the scope and methodology of this empirical study of
procedural protections in reproductive health care conscience laws. Part III
presents the research findings, emphasizing (1) the wide range and variability of
procedural protections established by the fifty states and the District of
Columbia; (2) the frequency with which conscience laws establish immunity
from civil liability for both individual and institutional health care providers; and
(3) the limited contexts in which some states, for reasons of patient protection,
withdraw providers' rights of refusal and/or civil immunity. Part IV offers

30. See infra Part III.C.
31. Unlike health care conscience laws, these laws restrict the circumstances in which
accommodations are granted in order to protect employers and the public from significant burdens. For
further discussion, see Nadia N. Sawicki, Unilateral Burdens and Third-Party Harms: Abortion
Conscience Laws
as Policy
Outliers, 95
IND.
L.
J.
(forthcoming
2020),

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3611011 [https://perma.cc/BF3B-EDMY].
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evidence to show why unlimited civil immunity provisions are a cause for
concern. This section draws on empirical research about the prevalence of
conscientious objections among health care providers, as well as the harms
experienced by patients when they are denied medically appropriate reproductive
services. It demonstrates that immunizing providers from civil liability will
prevent some patients from bringing successful tort suits. It also rebuts the claim
that access to the tort system is unnecessary in light of the patient protections
established by the Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).
Finally, Part V describes possible avenues for future research inspired by the
empirical findings presented herein.
I.

OVERVIEW

OF U.S. HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE LAWS

Public debates about conscientious objection in health care began in earnest
around the time that criminal prohibitions on abortion faced their first challenges
in court. 32 These debates reached a tipping point after the U.S. Supreme Court's
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade establishing that a woman has a constitutional right
to terminate a pregnancy in consultation with her physician, effectively
legalizing abortion nationwide. 33 Individual and institutional health care
providers expressed concern that as a result of the Court's decision, they might
be forced to participate in a procedure they found morally objectionable. 34 The
first federal and state conscience laws were enacted shortly thereafter in response
to this concern, 35 but the passage of these laws by no means settled the issue.

Today, the scope of conscientious objection in health care has extended
beyond physicians' objections to participation in abortion. 36 Other licensed
health care professionals-like nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical
technicians, and physician assistants-also claim rights to decline to participate

32. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Essay, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply
Divisive HealthcareProcedures,34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 47-50 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, The Limits
of Conscience] (describing the initial development of federal and state health care conscience
protections); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Empowering PrivateProtection of Conscience, 9 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 101, 106 (2010) [hereinafter Wilson, Empowering PrivateProtection of Conscience] (describing
federal conscience laws as "dat[ing]back to just after the United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision
in Roe v. Wade.").
33.

See 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wilson, Empowering Private Protection of Conscience, supra

note 32, at 106-07.
34.

Wilson, Empowering Private Protection of Conscience, supra note 32, at 107-08

(describing attempts to extend Roe v. Wade's non-interference provisions into affirmative rights to
access abortion services, the challenges faced by providers who were unwilling to perform abortions,
and the subsequent congressional response in the form of the Church Amendment).
35. Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 47-48, 50.
36. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing, Conscience Clausesand ConscientiousRefusal, 21
J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163 (2010) (describing the breadth of modern health care conscience laws); Adam
Sonfield, New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider 'Conscience,' Patient Needs,

GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 2004, at 1, 1 ("[T]he refusal clause debate is expanding to
implicate new participants and increasingly indirect forms of involvement.").
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in medical services they find objectionable. 37 Individuals who work in the health
or public health industries but are not licensed by the state-like public health
officials, medical students, and researchers-claim these rights as well. 38
Finally, institutional health care providers-like hospitals and skilled nursing
facilities-also regularly claim religious and conscientious objections to certain
medical services. 39 In the forty-seven years since Roe, conscience laws at both
the state and federal level have extended to protect this broader scope of
providers.40

Conscientious refusals arise most commonly in the context of reproductive
health services like abortion, sterilization, emergency contraception, and
contraception. However, refusals arise in other contexts as well. 41The treatments
available to patients at the end of life-for example, aid in dying, terminal
sedation, artificial nutrition and hydration, and other life-sustaining medical
2
treatments-are often impacted by health care providers' conscientious beliefs. 4

Medical services that have a connection with embryos or human stem cellssuch as vaccines derived from research on fetal stem cells-are also a point of
contention for some conscience-driven providers. 43 Other health care providers
cite conscience to justify their refusal to treat LGBTQ individuals. 44
Health care conscience laws in many states have expanded to encompass a
broad variety of medical services that some providers deem objectionable. A few
states offer protections to health care providers who object on grounds of
conscience to any medical service. 45 Moreover, many states' laws have extended
to protect not only providers who are unwilling to directly perform medical
services they deem objectionable, but also those whose involvement is more
37. Sonfield, supra note 36 (citing objections by ambulance staff, pharmacists, and nurses).
38. Id. (citing objections by state employees, hospital workers who handle paperwork and clean
surgical instruments, and police officers).
39.

Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious

Belief A CatholicPerspective,3 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 221, 235-36 (2002) (citing objections by Catholic
health care institutions); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1504
(2012) (citing the extension of conscience protections to "entire hospitals, healthcare systems, clinics,
and practice groups").
40. Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 49-50.
41. Pope, supra note 36, at 165-67 (citing objections to vaccination, terminal sedation,
circumcision, genetic screening, and others); Sepper, supra note 39, at 1508 (citing objections to
"condoms as part of HIV counseling; sterilization; contraception; removal or withholding of respirators,
artificial hydration, or nutrition; vaccination; blood transfusions; circumcision; fertility treatments;
euthanasia; pain management; [and] stem-cell-derived therapies.").
42. Sepper, supra note 39, at 1508.
43. Pope, supranote 36, at 167.
44. See, e.g., N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cty. Superior Court, 189
P.3d 959, 959 (Cal. 2008) (holding that physicians may not claim a First Amendment religious freedom
defense where they denied fertility treatment to a lesbian couple in violation of California's Unruh Civil
Rights Act); Tara M. Prairie et al., Intersections of PhysicianAutonomy, Religion, and Health Care
When Working with LGBT+ Patients, 19 HEALTH PROMOTION PRAC. 542, 544 (2018) (finding in a
survey of thirty-four physicians and residents that approximately one-third believed they have a right to
refuse treatment to LGBT+ patients and cited religious or moral reasons for their opposition).
45. See infra note 73.
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tangential. Health care providers have raised objections to performing various
services that they view as morally complicit-such as providing referrals,
transportation, and translation services; informing patients about the availability
of the service; and transferring prescriptions and medical records. 46 Depending
on how broadly a state's conscience law is worded, these indirect forms of
involvement may be protected as well. 47
It is important to note that the expansion of conscience protections beyond

abortion refusals also makes the political implications of these laws more
complex. Given their historical grounding in the abortion debate, conscience
laws have often been viewed as redounding only to the benefit of religious
conservatives. 48 However, providers with beliefs falling on the liberal side of the
political spectrum also have the opportunity to benefit from their protections,
especially as these laws have expanded to encompass a broader variety of
medical services. 49 In the end-of-life context, for example, some physicians
object to providing intensive treatment to dying patients who are unlikely to
recover (sometimes called "futile treatment"), a position that is at odds with
traditionally conservative perspectives about the inherent value of life.50 Other
health care providers argue that they have an affirmative conscience-based duty

46. See Pope, supra note 36, at 162 (describing examples of conscientious opposition to services
"tangential" to abortion).
47. Id For example, title 16, section 51.41 of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code protects
providers who object to "performing, participating in, or cooperating in abortion or sterilization" and
defines cooperating providers as those who, "whether or not directly involved in such procedures or in
attendance at the time when and in the room where the procedure takes place," maintain "duties . . of
a type peculiar to abortion or sterilization procedures and without whose services the procedure itself
could not be performed." The law offers examples of cooperation including "disposal of or assistance
in the disposal of aborted fetuses" and "cleaning the instruments used in the abortion or sterilization
procedure." 16 PA. CODE § 51.41 (2019). Examples of duties that do not constitute cooperation under
the law include ancillary services such as food preparation and housekeeping, record keeping by clerical
personnel, management and repair of surgical facilities, pre-abortion lab testing, and participation in
"any preparatory procedure leading to abortion or in the postabortion period." Id.
48.
Mark Campbell, Conscientious Objection in Medicine: Various Myths, 166 LAW & JUST.
28, 28-30, 36 (2011) (arguing that despite the historical, political, and practical connections between
abortion and conscientious refusals in health care, it is a myth that "the debate about conscientious
objection in medicine is a debate about abortion by proxy").
49. Id. at 30 (noting the need "to find common ground on which to consider whether, how and
to what extent conscientious objection in medicine might be justified in principle"); Sepper, supra note
39 (arguing that legal protections ought to extend to health care providers who, as a matter of conscience,
feel compelled to deliver services that others might oppose).
50.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Dzeng et al., Moral Distress Amongst American Physician Trainees

RegardingFutile Treatments at the End of Life: A QualitativeStudy, 31 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 93, 95
(2016) (finding that many physician trainees experience moral distress at the prospect of providing futile
treatment, which they equate to "torture" and "suffering"); Robert M. Veatch, Why Some "Futile"Care
is "Appropriate": The Implicationsfor ConscientiousObjection to Contraceptive Services, 60 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 438, 447 (2017) (drawing an analogy between conscientious objection by "liberal"
physicians who refuse to provide futile medical treatment and those from "traditional" belief systems
who refuse to provide contraceptive services).
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to provide services like abortion or aid-in-dying, and that conscience laws should
protect them against discrimination if they serve patients seeking such care. 5
The analysis of any health care conscience statute begins with an
understanding of the conditions under which its protections arise: what medical
services it applies to, what providers are protected, and what forms of
participation are protected. In addition to specifying the conditions of protection,
most conscience laws also establish explicit procedural mechanisms for

protection, outlining the consequences of a provider's exercise of their right to
refuse.
The simplest laws merely establish a health care provider's right to refuse
to participate in a medical service on the grounds of conscience and do not
elaborate on the consequences of the refusal. An illustrative example is a
Connecticut public health regulation, which simply states, "No person shall be
required to participate in any phase of an abortion that violates his or her
judgment, philosophical, moral or religious beliefs."5 2 Such "refusal-only" laws,
while simple on their face, are surprisingly difficult to interpret. 53 They grant a
right of refusal, but they do not explicitly specify the consequences of a
provider's exercise of that right. Thus, refusal-only laws fail to address the
primary concern of most conscience-driven providers. What these providers
hope for in legal protection is not a mere right to refuse-after all, physically
compelling a provider to perform an objectionable procedure is rare. Rather, they
seek relief from outside pressures and adverse consequences (for example,
termination of employment) that might arise as a result of their refusal.
Thus, most conscience laws supplement the right of refusal with explicit
procedural protections. These protective provisions establish that providers who
exercise their right of conscientious refusal will be immunized from specific
types of adverse consequences-whether adverse employment action, discipline
by a professional licensing board, civil liability for medical malpractice, or other
consequences. An illustrative example is Illinois's Health Care Right of
Conscience Act, which includes language establishing a refusing provider's
immunity from civil and criminal liability;54 discrimination in licensing,
employment, and privileging; 55 discrimination by employers and educational

51.

See Lisa H. Harris, Recognizing Conscience in Abortion Provision, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.

981 (2012); Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical
Practice,42 AM. J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 88 n.6 (2016).
52. CONN. AGENCIESREGS. § 19-13-D54(f) (2005).
53. See infra Part III.A.
54. "No physician or health care personnel shall be civilly or criminally liable to any person,
estate, public or private entity or public official by reason of his or her refusal to perform . . or
participate in any way in any particular form of health care service which is contrary to [his or her]
conscience." 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2019) (emphasis added).
55. "It shall be unlawful for any person, public or private institution, or public official to
discriminate against any person in any manner, including but not limited to, licensing, hiring, promotion,
transfer, staff appointment, hospital, managed care entity, or any other privileges, because of such
person's conscientious refusal." Id. 70/5 (emphasis added).
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institutions;5 6 and denial of government aid or benefits. 7 In delineating the
specific types of immunities that conscience-driven providers are entitled to,
laws like Illinois's provide greater assurance to those who fear that their
conscientious refusals will subject them to adverse consequences.
Current surveys of health care conscience laws, unfortunately, do not
address these procedural protections. In the past decade, many advocacy
groups,

58

news

organizations,59

research institutions, 60 scholars, 61 and others 62

have engaged in comprehensive surveys of current and proposed health care
conscience laws. But these surveys typically offer only a bird's-eye view of the
laws-identifying the services protected, and (at best) which providers are
protected and under what conditions. They do not identify or track the
mechanisms of protection established by conscience laws.
Furthermore, the academic literature on this issue is surprisingly barren.
While some scholars writing about health care conscience laws have

56.

"It shall be unlawful for any public or private employer, entity, agency, institution, official

or person, including but not limited to, a medical, nursingor other medical training institution,to deny

admission because of... [or] to impose any burdens in terms or conditions of employment on, or to
otherwise discriminate against, any applicant, in terms of employment, admission to or participationin
any programs for which the applicant is eligible . . on account of the applicant's refusal." Id. 70/7
(emphasis added).
57. "It shall be unlawful for any public official, guardian,agency, institution or entity to deny
anyform of aid, assistance or benefits, or to condition the reception [of such aid to] . . any person,
otherwise entitled . . because that person refuses to obtain, receive, accept, perform, assist, counsel,
suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any way in any form of health care services contrary to his
or her conscience." Id. 70/8 (emphasis added).
58.
See,
e.g.,
Refusing
to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER
INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/refusing-provide-health-services
[https://perma.cc/72A7-HZVM] (tracking conscience laws relating to abortion, sterilization, and
contraception by type of provider protected).
59. See, e.g., Conscience and Refusal Clauses, REWIRE.NEWS (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/conscience-and-refusal-clauses
[https://penna.cc/K4TU-SPPK] (tracking proposed and current conscience legislation).
60.
See, e.g., Refusal to Perform Abortions, POL'Y SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (Dec. 1, 2018),
http://lawatlas.org/datasets/refusal-to-perfonn-abortions
[https://penna.cc/EZ4C-XHEB]
(tracking
abortion conscience laws by type of provider and type of participation protected).
61. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 36, at 162-68 (tracking state health care conscience laws);
Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 47-52 (describing federal and state conscience
legislation); Kevin H. Theriot & Ken Connelly, Free to Do No Harm: Conscience Protectionsfor
HealthcareProfessionals,49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 549, 587-600 (2017) (tracking state health care conscience
laws).
62. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 43 Members of Congress in Support of Petitioners app.,
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) (mem.) (No. 15-862) (surveying state and federal
conscience laws related to abortion, contraception, fertility treatment, sterilization, military
service, capital punishment, assisted suicide, and euthanasia); PharmacistConscience Clauses:
Laws
and
Information,
NAT'L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/phannacist-conscience-clauses-laws-and-infonnation.aspx
[https://penna.cc/FD5Q-UDRD] (tracking pharmacist conscience laws).
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acknowledged the breadth of their procedural protections, 63 few have critically
analyzed these protections. 64 Only a single academic article, published over

twenty-five years ago, has ever categorized state conscience laws based on
common procedural protections; and the article does not describe the author's
research methodology. 65
Given the intense academic and public interest in the issue of conscientious
refusal, this gap in the literature on health care conscience laws is surprising and
troubling. It is difficult to imagine how scholars and policy-makers can engage
in nuanced debate about the law's role in protecting the right of conscientious
refusal when there is no clear understanding of how existing laws actually
operate.66
II.
RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODOLOGY

This Article draws upon an original dataset of state health care conscience
laws relating to reproductive services to identify the procedural mechanisms by
which these laws protect providers, with a particular focus on protections from
civil liability for refusal to participate in abortion. The primary aims of this

63. See R. Alta Charo, Health Care ProviderRefusals to Treat, Prescribe, Refer or Inform:
Professionalism and Conscience, 1 ADVANCE 119, 121 (2007) (pointing out that modern conscience
laws "recite an expansive list of actions that can no longer be taken against professionals who refuse to
provide health care services," including "immunity from medical or other professional malpractice
liability; protection from state licensing board disciplinary action; and protection from employment
[discrimination]"); Lawrence Nelson, Provider Conscientious Refusal of Abortion, Obstetrical
Emergencies, and Criminal Homicide Law, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 43, 43 (2018) (noting that many
conscience laws "offer sweeping immunity from legal liability," and arguing against criminal
immunity); Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discriminationin the Same-Sex MarriageDebates, 89 IND.
L.J. 703, 723 (2014) (identifying "three distinct conflicts" covered by conscience laws: employer
accommodation; civil, criminal, and professional penalties; and state funding); Jennifer E. Spreng,
Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defenses to Tort Liability for Failure to
Dispense Contraceptives, 1 ST. LouiS U. J. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 337, 373 (2008) (noting that conscience
laws include "protections against civil liability, employment discrimination, professional discipline,
denial of admission to professional training programs, and denial of public funds").
64. Notable exceptions include Rich, supra note 10, at 228 (arguing that health care providers
who depart from the standard of care should be subject to civil liability and administrative sanctions);
Nelson, supra note 63, at 48 (arguing that health care conscience laws should not protect providers from
criminal prosecution); Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause:
The Questfor Immunity in the Struggle Between ProfessionalDuties andMoral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 779, 801-04, 832 (2007) (arguing that when health care providers' conscientious refusals
impose burdens on others, "exemptions from malpractice, disciplinary, or employment actions are not
appropriate"); and Sepper, supra note 39, at 1572 (arguing that conscience laws should not provide
immunity from civil liability, but recognizing that legal protection from adverse employment action may
be necessary when the values of an individual and institutional health care provider conflict).
65.

Lynn D. Wardle, Protectingthe Rights of Conscience ofHealth CareProviders, 14 J. LEGAL

MED. 177, at 190-95 (1993) (identifying state laws establishing protections from civil liability; criminal
liability; and discrimination in employment, licensure, government benefits, and education, and
identifying the rare exceptions to these protections).
66. See generally Sawicki, supra note 21, at 15 (arguing for a "more nuanced policy debate"
regarding procedural protections in health care conscience laws).
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project are to discover (1) how frequently such laws include protections from
civil liability as compared to other types of procedural protections; (2) which
types of providers are granted civil immunity for their conscientious refusals;
and (3) whether and when there are any patient-protective limitations on
providers' rights to refusal or civil immunity (for example, in cases of medical
emergency, malpractice, or patient injury). Understanding the prevalence and
scope of civil immunity provisions will inform policy debates about how best to
limit the harms experienced by patients who are denied services on grounds of
conscience.

While fifty-state surveys are common in the legal academic literature, the
methodology behind such surveys is often opaque. 67 Often, it is unclear how a
researcher collected the relevant laws, how the laws were analyzed and/or coded,
and whether the researcher established any mechanisms of quality control to
ensure that the findings are reproducible. Only recently have legal scholars
begun to take a more systematic approach to the collection and observation of
law-one that satisfies the stringent requirements of social science research, and
merits consideration by peer reviewers outside the world of legal scholarship. 68
The research upon which this Article was based was conducted in
accordance with best practices for policy surveillance and legal mapping
established by LawAtlas, a project funded by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation and administered by the Center for Public Health Law Research at
Temple University Beasley School of Law. 69 These research standards are
grounded in principles of quality control and reproducibility, requiring redundant
coding by multiple researchers, and an iterative process of resolving coding
discrepancies. Importantly, these standards require that coding be done based on
impartial observation, rather than interpretationby individual researchers whose
perspectives may vary.

67. See Scott Burris et al., Policy Surveillance:A Vital Public Health PracticeComes ofAge,
41 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1151, 1152 (2016) (arguing that law is poorly integrated in the data
collection structure of public health and public health information, in part because "legal information
remains trapped in text files and pdfs, and as such is excluded from the universe of usable data").
68. Id. at 1153-54 (comparing legal mapping using "traditional methods of legal research and
analysis" with more modern methods that "transform the text of law into scientifically valid, quantitative
data for analysis"); David Presley et al., Creating Legal Data for Public Health Monitoring and
Evaluation:Delphi Standardsfor PolicySurveillance, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 27, 27 (2015) (comparing
the "long tradition of conducting '50 state surveys"' with "the use of scientific methods to create datasets
of legal variables suitable for use in evaluation research").
69. See Burris et al., supra note 67, at 1154-55 (2016) (explaining the process by which the
Center for Public Health Law Research developed best practices for scientific collection and coding of
statutes); Scott Burris,A Technical Guidefor PolicySurveillance 1(Pub. Health Law Research Program,
Temple
U.
Beasley
Sch.
Of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2014-34,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2469895
[https://perma.cc/2QKJ-S6GP]
(describing policy surveillance as "the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of
information about laws and other policies" and outlining the methodology for creating and coding a
legal dataset in accordance with best practices).
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The full dataset, research protocol, and findings are publicly available on
LawAtlas in an interactive format. 0 A brief description follows below.
A.

Methodology: Data Collection

Identification of the laws included in the dataset began in 2018, with the
collection of laws cited in two recent secondary source compilations7 ' of health
care conscience laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. This initial
set of laws was supplemented with Westlaw keyword searches of state statutes
and regulations and was further supplemented by reviewing the relevant table of
contents chapters for all identified laws. Two researchers conducted this research
independently, and all discrepancies were discussed and addressed.
Most jurisdictions have several statutes and/or regulations pertaining to

rights of conscience in health care. This dataset was narrowed to include only
those laws relating to conscience in the provision of health care services in a
health care setting by physicians, nurses, pharmacists, hospital employees,
hospitals, and other individual and institutional health care providers. Excluded
from the dataset were laws relating to conscience in health insurance or the
financing of health care services as well as laws relating to conscience in the
provision of health care services in prison settings (typically, laws relating to
physician participation in capital punishment). The dataset upon which this
research was based was further limited to those laws explicitly protecting
conscience in the context of reproductive services, defined as abortion,
sterilization, emergency contraception, contraception/family planning, and other

services offered in the reproductive health context. 72 This dataset does not
include state laws that establish conscience protections for all health care
services without referencing reproductive health services specifically, even
though some of these laws also include protections from civil liability. 73

70.

ProceduralProtectionsin Reproductive Health Care Conscience Laws, supra note 27.

-

71. Brief of Amici Curiae 43 Members of Congress in Support of Petitioners, supra note 62,
app.; Theriot & Connelly, supra note 61, at 575-76, 587-600.
72. "Other reproductive health care contexts" included assisted reproductive technology,
genetic counseling, medical use of fetal tissue, umbilical cord blood banking, research on gametes and
embryos, use of stem cells, and cloning. Because such laws are far less common than those applicable
to abortion, sterilization, contraception, and emergency contraception, their procedural protections were
not separately coded.
73. Few states establish conscience protections that are open-ended across all health care
services. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2019) (establishing protections for refusal to participate in
"any particular form of health care service which is contrary to the conscience of [the provider]"); id.
70/3(a) (defining "[h]ealth care" as "any phase of patient care, including but not limited to, testing;
diagnosis; prognosis; ancillary research; instructions; family planning, counselling, referrals, or any
other advice in connection with the use or procurement of contraceptives and sterilization or abortion
procedures; medication; surgery or other care ortreatment rendered by a physician or physicians, nurses,
paraprofessionals or health care facility, intended for the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of
persons; or an abortion as defined by the Reproductive Health Act'); Miss. CODE. ANN. §§ 41-107-5,
7 (2013) (establishing protections for refusal to participate in "a health care service that violates [the
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Methodology: Coding and Quality Control

Once the dataset was established, the author conceptualized coding
questions and variables and finalized them based on feedback from LawAtlas
staff. Coding questions and variables were then entered into MonQcle, a webbased software-coding platform developed by Legal Science LLC and the Center
for Public Health Law Research at Temple University Beasley School of Law.
A team of five researchers coded the laws of each jurisdiction by: (1) the
type of medical service they are applicable to; (2) which explicit procedural
protections, if any, they establish; (3) which providers, if any, benefit from civil
immunity; (4) whether there are any patient-protective limitations to the right of
refusal or civil immunity; and (5) whether the laws had been held unenforceable
in whole or in part by a judicial decision. Initial coding was based on the laws in
effect as of December 17, 2018.

All fifty-one jurisdictions were 100% redundantly coded, meaning that
each state record was placed in a set of ten (or eleven) jurisdictions and coded
by two researchers working independently. After each set, the author identified
each instance where two researchers coded different variables for the same
question and used this data to calculate the divergence rate. Under LawAtlas
methodology, divergence rates under 10% are considered satisfactory; if a set's
divergence rate is satisfactory, only 20% (rather than 100%) of the remaining
records must be redundantly coded. 74 The team's divergence rates all fell below
10%,75 but, to ensure the strongest possible quality control, the author continued
to require 100% redundant coding for the entire project. All divergences were
resolved through consultation and discussion with the team at weekly coding
review meetings.

Researchers coded these laws in accordance with a coding protocol that
included specific rules for coding each question, and which was periodically

provider's] conscience"); id § 41-107-3(a) (defining "health care service" as "any phase of patient
medical care, treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: patient referral,
counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or
administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment rendered by health
care providers or health care institutions"); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2019) (establishing
limited protections for refusal to participate in "the provision of or payment for a specific service if [a
provider, facility, or carrier] object[s] to so doing for reason of conscience or religion"); id
§ 70.47.160(2)(a) (same); id. § 48.43.005(25) (defining "health care service" as a "service offered or
provided by health care facilities and health care providers relating to the prevention, cure, or treatment
of illness, injury, or disease"); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22-B, § 9006.1 (2017) (prohibiting discrimination
against employees of public benefit corporations for refusal to participate in "aspects of direct patient
care that are in conflict with their religious, or ethical beliefs").
74. Published work on research methodology in policy surveillance references both 5% and
10% as acceptable divergence rates. See, e.g., Burris, supra note 69, at 5, 24-25. Such differences of
opinion proved irrelevant as the author chose to code all data redundantly.
75. The divergence rates were as follows: 5.18% for Set 1; 9.91% for Set 2; 3.60% for Set 3;
2.39% for Set 4; and 5.66% for Set 5.
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revised through the course of the project. 76 Questions and variables that were

causing confusion were edited for clarity. Some new variables were added and
then checked across the dataset to make sure coding was consistent. After all
jurisdictions were coded and discrepancies resolved, eleven jurisdictions were
coded by a naive coder who had not been previously involved with the project.
The naive coder was given a brief orientation and instructed to code the records
in accordance with the coding protocol all researchers had been using. The rate
of divergence between the naive coding and original coding was 5.46%, which
is more than satisfactory.77 There were only five substantive discrepancies that
required discussion and resolution; these were reviewed and resolved as a team.
C.

2019 Update

The initial dataset collected and coded laws were in effect as of December
17, 2018. In 2019, a team of two researchers updated the dataset and coding
based on the laws in effect as of December 31, 2019. The researchers reviewed

all laws in the original dataset and re-ran the original Westlaw search to capture
any additional legislative changes since the previous dataset was coded. Eight
states had amended, repealed, or added legislation relevant to the scope of this
project. The rate of divergence for the coding of these eight states was 2.02%.78
III.
RESEARCH FINDINGS

This study found that reproductive conscience laws vary dramatically in the
types of procedural protections they offer to providers but that most states
establish far stronger protections for health care providers than for patients.
State laws immunize health care providers and others from a range of
potential adverse consequences. For example, providers may be immunized from
civil liability, criminal prosecution, professional discipline, employment
discrimination, discrimination in educational opportunities, and loss of funding.
Immunity from civil liability, for both individuals and health care facilities, is by
far the most common of the various procedural protections established by these
state laws.
Moreover, in the majority of states that protect those who refuse to
participate in abortion, rights of refusal and civil immunity appear to be absolute.
In such states, there are no exceptions for cases of malpractice, denial of
76.
NADIA N. SAWICKI, POLICY SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, RESEARCH PROTOCOL:
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE LAWS (2019),

https://monqcle.com/upload/5eb429e85594f4245c8b4571/download [https://penna.cc/K2EH-DM9J].
77. See supranote 74.
78. However, only two of these eight states amended their legislation in a way that affected the
coding and final data. Of its Compiled Statutes, Illinois repealed chapter 720, act 510, section 13 and
chapter 745, act 30, section 1, and amended chapter 745, act 70, section 3. 2019 Ill. Legis. Serw. P.A.
101-13, §§ 905-15, -30, 910-73 (West). Vermont, which previously had no conscience law, enacted into
its Statutes title 18, sections 9496 and 9497. 2019 Vermont Laws No. 47 (H. 57).
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emergency treatment, or patient injury. It will likely come as a surprise to many
readers, including scholars knowledgeable in the field, that most states' abortion
conscience statutes have eliminated patients' common law right to recover
monetary damages for physical injuries caused by a health care provider's
conscience-based deviation from the standard of care.
A.

Distributionof ProceduralProtections

As described in Part II, most health care conscience laws operate by
establishing specific procedural protections for providers who decline to
participate in medical services that violate their conscientious beliefs. This study
found that the most common protection established by state law is protection
from civil liability. The next most common protections relate to disciplinary
action, discrimination, and adverse action by employers. 79
The majority of U.S. jurisdictions (forty-seven states) have passed
conscience laws that speak to participation in abortion. Forty-six of these states
establish a right on the part of individual and/or institutional health care
providers to refuse participation in abortion. 80 One state, Vermont, protects only

providers who choose to actively participate in abortion. 81 Fewer jurisdictions
have laws relating to conscience-driven refusal to participate in sterilization
(seventeen states), contraception (sixteen states), or emergency contraception

(five states). 82 Other health services related to reproductive health and

79. For more detail on how these terms were defined, see SAWICKI, supra note 76.
80. This study did not separately code what types of conduct were protected (e.g., refusal to
perform, participate, assist, refer) or whether a specific justification was required for refusal (e.g., based
on conscience, religion, ethics, personal beliefs). For data on the types of conduct protected by abortion
conscience laws, see Refusal to Perform Abortions, supra note 60.
81. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 9497(3)-(4) (2019) (stating that public entities shall not prohibit,
interfere with, or restrict a health care provider's choice to terminate or assist in terminating a
pregnancy). Of the forty-six states that protect provider refusals, six also protect the positive rights of
those who affirmatively choose to participate in abortion. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(5)(b)(c) (West 2020) (prohibiting disciplinary action due to "the willingness or refusal of such physician,
nurse or staff member or employee to perform or participate in abortion by reason of objection thereto
on moral, religious or professional grounds" (emphasis added)); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20184
(2019) (prohibiting adverse employment action employment taken "for the sole reason that [individuals,
staff, or employees] previouslyparticipatedin, or expressed a willingness toparticipatein, a termination
of pregnancy" (emphasis added)); 16 PA. CODE § 51.33(a) (2019) (establishing possible protections for
a health care facilities that "express a willingness or an objection to the performance of abortion or
sterilization" (emphasis added)); id. §§ 51.42(a), .43(a) (establishing protections for physicians, nurses,
hospital staff, students, and others "who express[] a willingness to participate in the performance of
abortion or sterilization" (emphasis added)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-13 (2020) (prohibiting
employment discrimination against any "physician, nurse, or other person who performs or refuses to
perform or assist in the performance of an abortion" (emphasis added)); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§ 103.002(b) (West 2020) (providing that a "health care facility may not discriminate against a
physician, nurse, staff member, or employee because of the person's willingness to participatein an
abortion procedure at another facility" (emphasis added)); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.150 (2019)
(prohibiting discrimination "in employment or professional privileges because of the person's
participationor refusal to participate in the termination of a pregnancy" (emphasis added)).
82. See infra Appendix A.
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reproductive technology are also implicated in some state conscience laws: stem
cell research and treatment (three states), research on gametes and embryos (two
states), cloning (two states), assisted reproductive technology (one state),
medical use of fetal tissue (one state), umbilical cord blood banking (one state),
and genetic counseling (one state). 83
This discussion, however, focuses primarily on the findings relating to
abortion conscience laws. The reason for this focus is twofold. First, abortion
conscience laws are far more common than conscience laws relating to other
reproductive services, and thus offer a richer perspective on how the vast
majority of states approach conscientious objection in the reproductive health
care sphere. Second, many of the serious patient harms described in Part IV.Bsuch as injuries arising from sub-standard miscarriage management-arise as a
result of denial of abortion. While conscience-driven denials of other
reproductive services, like sterilization and contraception, may also result in
patient harm, these harms are less likely to be recoverable under tort law for a
variety of reasons.84

As detailed further in Appendix B, and illustrated in Figure 1 below, of the
forty-seven jurisdictions with abortion-specific conscience laws (forty-six of
which protect rights of refusal),8 5 thirty-seven explicitly establish immunity from
civil liability for individual and/or institutional health care providers who refuse
to participate in abortion.8 6 Thirty states protect providers from "disciplinary
action." 8 7 This term is often unspecified and undefined, though it is occasionally
tied to specific adverse actors like employers. Twenty-six states protect providers

from "discrimination," a similarly vague term. Another twenty-six states provide
explicit protection against adverse actions by employers (for example, decisions
relating to hiring, dismissal, demotion, transfer, wages, or staff privileges).
Protections against adverse action by government actors, educational
institutions, criminal prosecutors, state licensing boards, and funding sources

83. See infra Appendix A.
84. See infra Part IV.C.
85. Among the seventeen states with sterilization-specific conscience laws, fifteen provide for
civil immunity. Civil liability protections were less common in laws relating to contraception and
emergency contraception. Sixteen states have contraception-specific laws, but only five establish
immunity from civil liability. Five states have laws relating to emergency contraception, but only one
establishes immunity from civil liability.
86. In this study, only the beneficiaries of civil liability protections were identified. For the other
categories of procedural protections, coding did not include whether the beneficiaries of those
protections were individual or institutional health care providers, or some subset thereof.
87. Per the Coding Protocol, "disciplinary action" was coded where a law referenced
"discipline," "professional discipline," "disciplinary action," "disciplinary or recriminatory action,"
"recrimination," "recriminatory action," "sanction," "penalty," or "punishment." SAWICKI, supra note
76.
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were less common. 88 Only four states establish a right to refuse but do not
explicitly delineate any specific procedural protections. 89
Figure 1. ProceduralProtections in Abortion Conscience Laws
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN ABORTION CONSCIENCE LAWS
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In interpreting these findings, it is important to recognize that the absence

of a particular procedural protection (or, indeed, of any procedural protections)
in state law does not mean that providers exercising their conscience rights in
those states are in fact unprotected from consequences. The findings presented
herein are based on coders' observation of statutory text alone. Thus, the fact
that only thirty-seven of the forty-six states with abortion-specific conscientious
refusal laws include explicit language protecting refusing providers from civil
liability should not be interpreted to mean that nine states 90 do affirmatively
allow patients to bring tort suits. Rather, a more accurate interpretationwould be
that legislation in nine states is silent on the issue of civil immunity for refusing
providers. Therefore, in these states, the question of whether injured patients

88.
These categories were selected to increase the precision of coding in light of states' varying
levels of statutory specificity. That said, there is clearly some overlap between the categories. For
example, statutes protecting providers from sanctions by state medical licensing boards were coded as
both "Government" and "Licensing," and statutes protecting providers from employment discrimination
were coded as both "Employment" and "Discrimination."
89.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154 (2020); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D54 (2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-204, 39-15-205 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-7 (2020).
90. Five of these states (Indiana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington), establish
other types of procedural protections besides including civil immunity. Four (Arizona, Connecticut,
Tennessee, and West Virginia) are "refusal-only" states that give no guidance regarding the potential
consequences of a refusal.
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retain the right to sue in cases of conscience-driven malpractice would have to
be decided by a judge. 91
Unfortunately, there has been very little litigation shedding light on how
best to interpret refusal-only conscience laws. In the few cases that have touched
on related questions, courts have reached varying conclusions. 92 However, as a
matter of logical statutory construction, it would seem difficult to interpret
refusal-only laws as granting providers a right of refusal without also eliminating
patients' right to a tort cause of action. Conscientious refusal statutes effectively
eliminate any duty a provider might have to participate in a requested service.

As a result, it would seem illogical to argue that the patient in such a case would
nevertheless maintain a right to sue for a breach of that former duty. 93
In the five states that explicitly establish procedural protections not
including civil immunity, the same reasoning would likely apply. Certainly, a

textualist argument could be made that when a state law enumerates certain
protective mechanisms but excludes others, that exclusion should be taken at

&

91. See Harry H. Wellington & Lee A. Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political
Process:A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1552 (1963) (stating that legislative
silence is as consistentwith intent to relegate interpretation to the courts as it is with a desire orpreference
for a particular result or interpretation).
92. Compare, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians
Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (declining to read Arizona's refusal-only law
broadly enough to include civil immunity for refusing providers, in reliance on a state constitutional
prohibition on "abrogation of . . actions in tort which trace origins to the common law" (citation
omitted)), with California v. United States, No. C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2008) (dismissing the State of California's challenge to the federal Weldon Amendment
which prohibits government discrimination against health care providers who refuse to participate in
abortion, but does not include an explicit emergency exception-concluding that "[t]here is no clear
indication" that enforcement of EMTALA or California's emergency treatment law "would be
considered 'discrimination' under the Weldon Amendment if the required medical treatment was
abortion-related services"). While the Means case did not directly address this issue (because the suit
was brought against the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, an entity that was not protected
by Michigan's conscience law), one scholar has interpreted dicta in the Sixth Circuit's opinion as
"demonstrate[ing] [that] these statutes potentially deny women civil redress by obviating the physician's
duty to the patient in accordance with the standard of care." Jane A. Hartsock, Provider Conscientious
Refusal, Malpractice, and theRight to Civil Recourse, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 66, 67 (2018) (citing Means
v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643, 652 (6th Cir. 2016)). Another scholar, however,
interprets the district court's discussion of hospitals' duties as suggesting that the court "seems not to
regard state liability protections as a bar to medical malpractice claims." William L. Allen,
Accommodating Conscience Without Curtailing Women's Rights, Health, and Lives, 18 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 64, 65 (2018).
93. See Kristen Marttila Gast, Cold Comfort Pharmacy: Pharmacist Tort Liability for
ConscientiousRefusals to DispenseEmergency Contraception, 16 TEx. J. WOMEN &L. 149,171 (2007)
(arguing, in the context of emergency contraception, that "the existence of a refusal clause . . appears
effectively to limit the pharmacist's duty of care with respect to that act," and concluding that if such a
refusal does not violate a duty of care, "it cannot provide the basis for negligence liability, regardless of
whether or notthe operative refusal clause states specifically that the pharmacistwill notbe held liable").
But see Spreng, supra note 63, at 382 (interpreting a conscience law that provides explicit protection
only against employment discrimination and concluding that while the law "states a strong public policy
about conscience protection, . . .it does not create a religious defense from tort liability").
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face value. Consider, for example, section 9.02.150 of the Revised Code of
Washington, titled Refusing to Perform, the text of which states in full:

No person or private medical facility may be required by law or contract
in any circumstances to participate in the performance of an abortion if
such person or private medical facility objects to so doing. No person
may be discriminated against in employment or professional privileges

because of the person's participation or refusal to participate in the
termination of a pregnancy.

The text of the Washington law grants certain providers a right to refuse
participation in abortion, and explicitly protects providers from discrimination

in employment and professional privileges. It does not explicitly establish civil
immunity for refusing providers. However, given that the law effectively

eliminates any duty providers may have to participate in abortion, it would be
difficult to argue that a provider's refusal constitutes a breach of duty for which
an injured patient might recover in tort.
B.

Beneficiariesof Civil Liability Protections

The research team further analyzed abortion refusal laws with civil liability
protections to assess which categories of health care providers are entitled to civil
immunity. As detailed further in Appendix C, each of the thirty-seven states that
expressly established civil immunity for abortion refusal identified specific
categories of providers entitled to such immunity. The most commonly protected
groups were "any person" (twenty-six states), health care facilities (twenty-six

states), physicians (seventeen states), registered nurses (sixteen states), and staff
working at health care facilities (fourteen states). Other categories of providers
also singled out for civil immunity included private health care facilities (nine
states), health care providers (six states), students (five states), pharmacists (three
states), any licensed professionals (two states), mental health professionals (two
states), public employees (two states), and religious health care facilities (one
state). 9
Overall, all but two states protected extremely broad categories of
individuals-either "persons" generally (not defined as health care
professionals), health care providers, or staff and employees of health care
facilities. 95 All but five states provided civil immunity to at least some health
care facilities. 96 An additional five states limited institutional protections to
94. Again, although there is overlap between these categories, these variables were selected so
that analysis of the state laws could be as granular as possible.
95. The two outlier states did not extend their civil immunity provisions to any individual
providers. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.191 (2019) (protecting only private health facilities); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 435.475 (2019) (protecting only hospitals).
96. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2013) (protecting only persons and pharmacists); IOWA CODE
§ 146.2 (2020) (protecting only persons); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 121 (2003) (protecting only
physicians and health facility staff); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45-1 (2019) (protecting only health care
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private facilities, 97 and one state protected facilities only if they were religiously
affiliated. 98
Although most states explicitly identify narrower categories of providers
for civil immunity, almost every state protects a very broad range of individuals
(thirty-five of thirty-seven states), and all or some health care facilities (thirtytwo of thirty-seven states). Thus, in civil immunity states, most individuals and
facilities are immune from suit if their unwillingness to participate in abortion
falls below the standard of care and causes patient injury. 99
C.

Patient-protectiveLimitations

Finally, the researchers analyzed the laws to determine whether there
existed any significant statutory limitations on providers' right to refuse
participation in abortion and/or be immunized from civil suit for such refusals.
This study focused exclusively on limitations and conditions that most directly
impact patients. For example, a requirement that a physician or hospital inform

the patient of their refusal would be coded, but a requirement that a refusing
physician notify only their employer would not.

One might imagine that states with health care conscience laws might carve
out some exceptions with the intent of protecting patients from serious harm.
However, surprisingly few states have established any meaningful patient
protections by restricting providers' right to refuse to participate in abortion.

Such restrictions might, for example, limit providers' rights of refusal and/or
civil immunity in situations where patients require emergency treatment.

Alternatively, they might condition providers' rights on affirmative disclosure of
information regarding access to the requested services. However, as illustrated
in Figure 2 below, twenty-six of the forty-six states with abortion-specific refusal
laws impose no limitations on the right of refusal. i Thus, in over half of U.S.
states, patients harmed by conscience-driven denials of abortion (even denials
that depart from the standard of care) might have no civil remedies available.

providers, physicians, and nurses); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2002) (protecting only physicians
and health facility staff).
97. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (West 2020) (protecting private facilities, and also
physicians, nurses, hospital employees, and public employees); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.191 (protecting
only private facilities); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-741 (2019) (protecting private facilities, and also persons,
physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and facility staff); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2019) (protecting
private facilities, and also persons, physicians, and nurses); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-6-105, 35-6-106
(2019) (protecting private facilities, and also persons).
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c) (West 2020) (protecting "nonprofit hospital[s]"
and "other facility[ies] or clinic[s] . . organized or operated by a religious corporation or other religious
organization," and also persons, physicians, nurses, and facility staff).
99. Among the fifteen states with sterilization-specific conscience laws that explicitly establish
civil immunity, all protect at least one broad category of individual providers (persons, providers, or
facility staff), and all but three protect health care facilities.
100. See infra Appendix D.
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Figure2. Patient-ProtectiveLimitations in Abortion Refusal Laws
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In other reproductive health contexts, we see similar patterns. Of the
seventeen states with conscience laws relating to sterilization, only four limit
providers' refusal rights in any way.' Of the sixteen states with contraception
laws, only six states limit providers' refusal rights or impose conditions to protect

101.
ALA. CODE § 22-21B-4(b) (2019) (establishing civil immunity for providers who refuse to
participate "except when failure to do so would immediately endanger the life of a patient"); 745 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/6 (2019) (specifying that the law does not relieve physicians from "any duty . . under
any laws concerning current standards of medical practice or care, to inform his or her patient of the
patient's condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks and benefits of treatment options," nor
from legal obligations regarding emergency medical care); id. 70/6.1 (requiring health care facilities to
adopt "access to care and information protocols .. .designed to ensure that conscience-based objections
do not cause impairment of patients' health," where such protocols must ensure that patients be given
informed consent disclosures; be either transferred, provided with the service by another provider in the
facility, or given information in writing about other providers who may offer the service; and, in cases
of transfer or referral, have their medical records transferred); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20214(d) (West 2020) (limiting civil immunity for providers who refuse to refer patients for abortion or
sterilization in cases where the refusal "would reasonably be determined as: (1) The cause of death or
serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient; and (2) [o]therwise contrary to the
standards of medical care"); 16 PA. CODE § 51.31(e) (2019) (requiring that a hospital's ethical policy
regarding abortion and sterilization be "freely available and conspicuously posted for public
inspection"); id. §§ 51.42(a), .43(a) (establishing that protections for individual providers do not apply
where the providers' "willingness, refusal, objection, statement or manifestation of attitude [regarding
abortion or sterilization] constitutes an overt act which disrupts hospital procedures, operations, or
services or which endangers the health or safety of any patient").
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Of the five states with emergency contraception laws, three states

limit providers' refusal rights.' 03

Among the forty-six states with abortion refusal laws, only a single state,
Maryland, explicitly limits a provider's civil immunity where their conduct has
violated the standard of care. However, Maryland's law does not provide patients
with a remedy for all harms. Rather, it only applies in cases where the provider
breaches a duty to give a referral and that breach causes the patient's "death or
serious physical injury." 4

Other states limit providers' conscience protections in situations where
conscience-based refusals might seriously endanger patients. Thirteen states
limit the right to refuse participation in abortion cases where a patient requires
emergency treatment.1 05 A few states restrict the scope of abortion objections to
102.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 1746.1(b)(9) (2020) (requiring refusing pharmacists to "referthe
patient to another appropriate health care provider"); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2001) (requiring agency
directors to "reassign the duties of [refusing] employees"); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6 (specifying that
the law does not relieve physicians from "any duty . . under any laws concerning current standards of
medical practice or care, to inform his or her patient of the patient's condition, prognosis, legal treatment
options, and risks and benefits of treatment options," nor from legal obligations regarding emergency
medical care); id. 70/6.1 (requiring health care facilities to adopt "access to care and information
protocols . . designed to ensure that conscience-based objections do not cause impairment of patients'
health," where such protocols must ensure that patients be given informed consent disclosures; be either
transferred, provided with the service by another provider in the facility, or given information in writing
about other providers who may offer the service; and, in cases of transfer or referral, have their medical
records transferred); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 463.6(d) (2020) (requiring employees of
social service departments to report their conscientious refusals to supervisors, "who in turn shall assign
another appropriate staff member .. .in [their] place"); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (2019) (requiring
employees of the Oregon Health Authority to report their conscientious refusals to supervisors "in order
that arrangements may be made for eligible persons to obtain such information and services from another
employee"); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 253.075(3)(b) (2020) (requiring agency directors to "reassign the duties
of [refusing] employees in order to carry out the [statute's] provisions").
103. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(B) (2020) (requiring return of the patient's prescription);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 1746(b)(5) (2020) (requiring pharmacists to "refer the patient to another
emergency contraception provider"); IDAHO CODE § 18-611(4), (6) (2019) (limiting rights to refusal
and civil immunity in "life-threatening situations").
104. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(d) (limiting civil immunity for providers whose
refusal to refer a patient "would reasonably be determined as: (1) The cause of death or serious physical
injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient; and (2) [o]therwise contrary to the standards of
medical care").
105.
ALA. CODE § 22-21B-4(b) (limiting civil immunity for refusing providers in cases where
such refusal "would immediately endanger the life of a patient"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123420(d) (West 2020) (limiting refusal rights and civil immunity in cases of "medical emergency . .
and spontaneous abortions"); IDAHO CODE § 18-611(4) (limiting immunity from civil liability for
refusing providers in "life-threatening situations"); id. § 18-611(6) (requiring a provider who "invokes
a conscience right in a life-threatening situation where no other health care professional capable of
treating the emergency is available" to "provide treatment and care until an alternate health care
professional capable of treating the emergency is found"); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6 (specifying that
the law does not relieve providers "from obligations under the law of providing emergency medical
care"); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2020) (excluding from the definition of abortion medical care intended to
treat "a serious physical condition requiring emergency medical treatment necessary to save the life of
a mother"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(1) (West 2020) (prohibiting public health care facilities
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exclude procedures intended to treat miscarriage (four states)1 06 or ectopic
pregnancy (three states),

07

conditions that can seriously threaten a pregnant

patient's health.
Some states have also established patient-protective conditions on the
exercise of providers' refusal rights. Eight states impose a duty to notify the
patient of the refusal or of the hospital's general policy opposing abortion.1 08
from performing abortions "except to save the life of the pregnant woman"); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1061.23 (2020) (limiting refusal rights where "a medical emergency compels the immediate
performance of an abortion because the continuation of the pregnancy poses an immediate threat and
grave risk to the life or permanent physical health of the pregnant woman"); id. § 40:1061.5 (limiting
state employees' refusal rights where a physician-employee "is acting to save or preserve the life of the
pregnant woman"); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(d) (limiting immunity from civil liability
"if the failure to refer a patient [for abortion] would reasonably be determined as: (1) The cause of death
or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient; and (2) [o]therwise contrary to the
standards of medical care"); NEV. REv. STAT. § 632.475(3) (2019) (limiting nurses' refusal rights and
protection from employment discrimination in "medical emergency situations"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 1-741(B) (2019) (limiting rights to refuse to "participate in medical procedures . . which involve
aftercare of an abortion patient" where such aftercare "involves emergency medical procedures which
are necessary to protect the life of the patient"); id. § 1-741(C) (limiting refusal rights and protections
from civil liability and disciplinary action in cases where "a woman is in the process of the spontaneous,
inevitable abortion of an unborn child, the death of the child is imminent, and the procedures are
necessary to prevent the death of the mother"); id. § 1-728c(1) (limiting protections from employment
discrimination in cases where a "pregnant woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or
physical illness which .. . causes the woman to be in imminent danger of death unless an abortion is
immediately performed or induced and there are no other competent personnel available to attend to the
woman"); id. § 1-568(E) (limitingprotections from civil liability where "abortion is necessary to prevent
the death of the mother"); 16 PA. CODE §§ 51.42(a), .43(a) (limiting protections where an individual's
refusal "endangers the health or safety of any patient"); id. § 51.43(b) (1977) (limiting student and
employee refusal rights in cases of "emergency surgical procedure which involves an inevitable
abortion"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2019) (establishing protections from civil liability for private
facilities that refuse to allow abortion, but prohibiting facilities from "refus[ing] an emergency
admittance"); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004 (West 2020) (limiting private facilities' refusal rights
where "a physician determines that the life of the mother is immediately endangered").
106.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(d) (speaking to refusal rights and civil immunity
in the context of "spontaneous abortions"); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.9(1)(b) (2020) (excluding, from
the definition of abortion, any action done with the intent to "[r]emove a dead unborn child or induce
delivery of the uterine contents [where] the pregnancy has ended or is in the unavoidable and untreatable
process of ending due to spontaneous miscarriage,... spontaneous abortion, missed abortion, inevitable
abortion, incomplete abortion, or septic abortion"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741(C) (limiting providers'
rights and immunities with respect to "medical procedures in which a woman is in the process of the
spontaneous, inevitable abortion of an unborn child, the death of the child is imminent, and the
procedures are necessary to prevent the death of the mother"); 16 PA. CODE § 51.43(b) (limiting the
right "to refuse to participate in an emergency surgical procedure which involves an inevitable
abortion").
107. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151(1) (2020) (excluding, from the definition of abortion,
"the use of any means to . . terminate an ectopic pregnancy"); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.9(1)(c)
(excluding, from the definition of abortion, any action done with the intent to "[r]emove an ectopic
pregnancy"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301(1)(b)(ii) (West 2019) (excluding, from the definition of
abortion, "removal of an ectopic pregnancy").

108.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c) (requiring refusing facilities to "post notice of

that proscription in an area . . that is open to patients and prospective admittees"); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/6.1 (2019) (requiring health care facilities to "adopt written access to care and information
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Two states require that providers who refuse to participate directly in abortions

nevertheless ensure that the patient can access the service from another provider
(coded as "Referral").' 09 Two states require refusing providers to give the patient
information regarding access to the requested service." 0 Two states require that
a refusing provider return the patient's prescription."' Only one state imposes a
statutory requirement that refusing providers satisfy the duty to secure a patient's

informed consent, including the duty to inform patients of "legal treatment
options" and the risks and benefits of these options."1 2
While these types of conditions provide weaker patient protections than
emergency treatment requirements, they nevertheless play an important role in
ensuring that patients have the option of seeking care elsewhere." 3 Consider

Tamesha Means, whose provider did not fully inform her about the risks of her

protocols . . designed to ensure that conscience-based objections do not cause impairment of patients'
health" and requiring that patients of refusing providers "either be provided the requested health care
service by others in the facility or be notified that the health care will not be provided and be referred,
transferred, or given information"); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.20(4) (2020) (requiring a refusing
individual to "notify any patient before such person provides any consultation or service . . . of the
existence of a health care service that he will decline to provide" on grounds of conscience); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-337 (1977) (requiring that a refusing facility "inform the patient of its policy not to
participate in abortion procedures."); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.9(b)(10) (2020)
(conditioning refusal rights and civil immunity for hospitals on a requirement that the hospital "inform
the patient of its decision notto participate"); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475(1) (2019) (conditioning refusal
rights and civil immunity for hospitals on a requirement that the hospital "notify the person seeking
admission to the hospital of its policy"); 16 PA. CODE § 51.31(e) (2019) (requiring that a hospital's
ethical policy regarding abortion and sterilization be "freely available and conspicuously posted for
public inspection"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-105 (2019) (requiring refusing facilities to "inform any
prospective patient seeking an abortion of its policy not to participate in abortion procedures").
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b) (2013) (granting refusal rights and civil immunity to
pharmacists who decline to fill prescriptions for drugs whose intent is termination of pregnancy, but
requiring that "the pharmacist shall make all reasonable efforts to locate another pharmacist who is
willing to fill such prescription" or, alternatively, return the patient's prescription); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 70/6.1 (requiring health care facilities to adopt "access to care and information protocols"
ensuring that patients either be provided with the service by another provider in the facility, or
transferred, referred elsewhere, or given information about other providers who may offer the service).
110.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6.1; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.9(b)(10)
(establishing refusal rights and civil immunity for hospitals, "provided that the hospital . . shall inform
the patient of appropriate resources for services or information").
111. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(B) (2020) (requiring a refusing pharmacy, hospital,
health professional, or employee to "return to the patient the patient's written prescription order"); GA.

CODE ANN. § 16-12-142(b) (requiring a refusing pharmacist to "immediately return the prescription to
the prescription holder").
112.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6 (2019) ("Nothing in this Act shall relieve a physician from any
duty, which may exist under any laws concerning current standards of medical practice or care, to inform
his or her patient of the patient's condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks and benefits of
treatment options, provided, however, that such physician shall be under no duty to perform, assist,
counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any way in any form of medical practice or health
care service that is contrary to his or her conscience.")
113.
That said, the option of seeking care elsewhere may not be available to some patients. In
particular, patients in rural areas with few health care facilities, patients whose health insurance plans
limit their choice of providers, and patients with serious medical conditions who do not have the option
of safe transfer may have limited alternative treatment options.
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condition. She did not know about the risks and benefits of the various treatment
options available to her (including termination and extraction of the pregnancy),
Mercy Health System's prohibition on pregnancy termination, or the availability
of treatment elsewhere. Had one or more of these requirements been in place in
Michigan, Ms. Means may have been able to seek care at another facility and
possibly avoid the injuries she experienced.
Notably, even those statutes that limit providers' conscience rights in an
effort to prevent immediate harm to patients prioritize patient safety only in

limited contexts. For example, Maryland maintains a patient's right to bring civil
suit for violations of the standard of care only where a provider's refusal to make
a referral for an abortion (as opposed to refusal to participate in an abortion)
causes "death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury."" 4 If a
Maryland provider declines to participate in an emergency abortion but does
make a referral, they would be immune from civil liability, even if the resulting
delay causes the patient's death. In all cases, patients lose the opportunity to
recover tort damages if they do not suffer injuries that a court or jury concludes
are "serious" or "long-lasting."
In other states, emergency exceptions may protect some patients but not

others, depending on the identity of the refusing provider. For example, Texas
does not require that private health care facilities "make [their] facilities
available for the performance of an abortion unless a physician determines that
the life of the mother is immediately endangered," and presumably, these
facilities would not be held liable for failure to do so." 5 Although Texas also
protects individual providers who refuse to participate in abortion, their
protections do not include emergency exceptions. Thus, a patient denied an
emergency abortion in Texas might be able to bring a cause of action against a
private hospital but not against an individual provider.
D. Summary of Civil Liability Protections
Taken together, the findings paint a troubling picture for patients who have
suffered injuries as a result of conscience-based deviations from the medical
standard of care. In most states, patients do not have the opportunity for legal
recovery when an individual or institutional health care provider's refusal to
terminate a pregnancy violates the standard of care. These legal limitations will
likely have the greatest impact on patients experiencing miscarriages, ectopic

pregnancies, or other pregnancies that threaten their life or health." 6 And in most
states, providers who deny abortion services have no duty to notify patients that
such services may be medically appropriate and available at another facility.

114. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(d) (West 2020).
115.
The Texas law does not explicitly state the obligations of public hospitals. TEX. OCC. CODE.
ANN. § 103.004 (West 2020).
116. See infra Part V.B.
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Most states with abortion-specific conscience laws either implicitly or
explicitly grant providers immunity from civil liability. As detailed further in
Part IILA, and illustrated in Figure 3 below, thirty-seven states explicitly
immunize providers from civil liability for their conscience-based refusal.
Another nine states have conscience laws that would likely be interpreted as
establishing civil immunity despite the absence of explicit language.
Figure3. Immunity from Civil Liability in Abortion Refusal Laws

Szates itcvil
P ,ovisions

mmunity

As detailed further in Part IIC., and illustrated in Figure 4 below, only
thirteen of the forty-six states with abortion refusal laws limit providers' right to
refuse treatment and/or permit patients to bring civil suit in life-threatening or
emergency situations. However, these laws limit liability only for some
providers and in some circumstances.
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Figure 4. Emergency Exceptions in Abortion Refusal Laws

Sttswith emergency

Only one state that establishes a right to refuse to participate in abortion,
Illinois, requires providers to fulfill their common law duty to inform patients of
all available treatment options, which may include abortion." No state limits
providers' right of refusal or civil immunity when their refusal to participate
abortion in a non-emergent situation violates the standards of medical care.
Finally, four states and the District of Columbia do not have legislation
explicitly protecting health care providers who decline to participate in abortions
for reasons of conscience." That said, one of these states-Mississippi-has a
general conscience law that grants individual and institutional providers the right
to refuse to participate in any health care service and grants them civil immunity

117.
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6 (2019) (requiring physicians to comply with any duties arising
from "laws concerning current standards of medical practice or care" to inform a patient of their
"condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks and benefits of treatment options," but stating
that physicians have no duty to "counsel, suggest, recommend, [or] refer . . [for any] health care service
that is contrary to his or her conscience"); id. 70/6.1(1) (requiring health care facilities, personnel, and
physicians to inform patients of their "condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks and
benefits of the treatment options in a timely manner, consistent with current standards of medical
practice or care").
118.
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Mississippi, and New Hampshire do not have any
abortion specific conscience laws. Vermont's abortion conscience law protects providers who choose to
participate in abortion, but not those who refuse. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 9497(3)-(4) (2019) (stating
that public entities shall not prohibit, interfere with, or restrict a health care provider's choice to terminate
or assist in terminating a pregnancy).
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in such cases.11 9 The District of Columbia also has a general conscience law, but
it protects only employees of public benefit corporations from employment
discrimination.12 It does not explicitly address civil liability.'21 That said, the
District of Columbia law, unlike Mississippi's, establishes exceptions in cases
where the patient's "safety is in jeopardy," and it requires that managers "assess
and ensure appropriate staffing so that patient care needs are met."122 Colorado
has laws protecting providers' rights of conscience in the context of sterilization,
contraception, and emergency contraception, but not abortion.1 23 New
Hampshire does not appear to have any health care conscience laws. In 2019,

Vermont's legislature passed the Freedom of Choice Act, which was aimed at
safeguarding reproductive freedom and prohibits public entities from interfering
with a health care provider's choice to participate in abortion; it does not protect
providers who refuse to participate.1 24 Thus, in four of the five jurisdictions with
no abortion-specific conscientious refusal law, an injured patient could
potentially bring a lawsuit if a health care provider's refusal to participate in
abortion violated the standard of care.1 25

Considering all the data, a patient injured by a provider's conscience-driven
refusal to participate in abortions would be barred from recovering tort damages
in all but seventeen states.1 26 In the seventeen states with no statutory bar,
recovery would likely be permitted only in life-threatening or emergency
situations, rather than in all contexts where the provider's conscientious refusal
violates the standard of care. Moreover, a patient's remedy may be further
limited as most states bar tort recovery against some type of providers. Thus,
these states deny patients like Tamesha Means, who are physically imperiled
when they are unable to access abortion services, the opportunity to recover in
tort for their injuries.

119. MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 41-107-5, -7 (2013). The law does not include any patient-protective
limitations.
120. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22-B, § 9006.1 (2017) (protecting employees of public benefit
corporations from employment discrimination for their conscientious refusal to participate in "certain
aspects of direct patient care that are in conflict with their religious, or ethical beliefs").
121. Nevertheless, a judge might interpret it as implicitly establishing civil immunity. See supra
Part III.A.
122. §§ 9006.1, .2(e).
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-10-235 (2019) (sterilization); id §§ 25-6-102, 25-6-207
(contraception); id § 25-3-110 (emergency contraception).
124.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 9497 (2019). Prior to 2019, Vermont had no health care conscience
laws.
125.
Colorado (establishing reproductive conscience laws applicable only to sterilization,
contraception, and emergency contraception), New Hampshire (no reproductive conscience laws),
Vermont (no abortion refusal law, no other reproductive conscience laws), and the District of Columbia
(establishing general conscience protections applicable only to employees and managers of public
benefit corporations).
126.
These include the thirteen states that restrict providers' refusal rights in emergencies and
four of the five states with no abortion-specific refusal laws.
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IV.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL REMEDIES FOR INJURED PATIENTS

The prevalence of open-ended liability protections in reproductive health
conscience laws creates a cause for concern. The data demonstrate that in most
states, patients who suffer injury as a result of a provider's conscientious refusal
to participate in abortion lose their right to seek legal recovery for their injuries.
Critics may challenge the significance of these findings, arguing that civil
liability protections do not significantly impact patients' ability to recover tort
damages for their injuries. This Section counters four potential arguments that
might be used to minimize the claim that state laws establishing a "conscience
defense to malpractice" harm patients.
First, some may argue that legally sanctioned conscientious refusals impact
only a few patients because only a minority of health care providers decline to
participate in reproductive services for reasons of conscience. This Section

demonstrates, however, that conscience-based objections to reproductive
services like abortion are quite common, particularly at the institutional level.
Second, critics may claim that even if a high number of providers claim
conscience protections, patients might not suffer severe injuries that would
warrant tort recovery. While some denials of reproductive care are unlikely to
cause serious injury, numerous cases demonstrate that serious physical injuries
warranting tort recovery can and do occur.

Third, critics may argue that a patient with significant injuries would be
unlikely to prove breach of duty in a malpractice suit because health care
providers have no legal duty to participate in abortion. However, given that the

termination of a pregnancy is a medically appropriate treatment for many healthharming pregnancies, a jury might reasonably conclude that a denial of such
treatment-and more importantly, denial of information about this treatment
option-violates the standard of care.
Finally, some will argue that even if civil immunity laws withdraw patients'
rights to tort recovery in state court, patients have adequate protections

established by federal law under EMTALA. However, this Section demonstrates
that EMTALA provides only limited protections and may not be a viable remedy
for many patients injured by conscience-based refusals.
A.

Provider ConscientiousRefusals Impact the Delivery of Health Care

While it is impossible to quantify precisely how many patients may be
affected by conscience-driven refusals, numerous studies suggests that the
impact may be significant. Individual and institutional providers frequently
report that they would decline to offer medically indicated health services when
they oppose those services on conscience grounds. If the prevalence of
conscience-based denials of care is as high as these studies suggest, millions of
patients risk being denied reproductive health care services. And as a result of
civil immunity laws in the majority of states, these patients lack the opportunity
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to seek legal redress if they were injured by a conscientious refusal that violated
the standard of care.
1.

The Effect ofInstitutionalReligious Perspectives on Delivery ofHealth
Care Services

At the institutional level, religious commitments have a dramatic impact on
the delivery of care. As of 2016, four of the ten largest hospital systems in the
U.S. were Catholic.1 27 In addition, according to the Catholic Health Association
of the United States, Catholic hospitals treat one in seven patients.1 28 The United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops' Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services bind these hospitals by limiting the services that
they can provide, including nearly absolute prohibitions on abortion,
sterilization, and contraception.129 As a result of state laws that protect
institutional conscience rights, patients seeking care at religiously affiliated
hospitals face these prohibitions even when they conflict with common medical
practice.

Surveys of physicians working in religiously affiliated hospitals
demonstrate that institutional policies may conflict with providers' clinical
judgment about best practices in reproductive care.1 30 One national survey found
that among OB/GYNs working in religiously affiliated health care institutions,
37% had experienced "conflict with the institutions regarding religiously based
policies for patient care."131 Among OB/GYNs practicing in Catholic hospitals,
this figure rose to 52%.132

127.
Lois UTTLEY &
HOSPITALS
AND

CHRISTINE KHAIKIN,
HEALTH

MERGERWATCH,
SYSTEMS

GROWTH
8

OF CATHOLIC
(2016),

http://staticl.l.sgspcdn.com/static/f/816571/27061007/1465224862580/MWUpdate-2016MiscarrOflMedicine-report.pdf [https://penna.cc/2GKR-86NZ].
128.
Facts
Statistics,
CATHOLIC
HEALTH
ASS'N
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.chausa.org/about/about/facts-statistics [https://penna.cc/W6XK-DMKM].
129. See ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 13, at 4 (describing the purpose of
the USCCB Directives as "reaffirm[ing] the ethical standards of behavior in health care that flow from
the Church's teaching about the dignity of the human person" and "provid[ing] authoritative guidance
on certain moral issues that face Catholic health care today."); id at 18-19 (prohibiting abortion, which
is defined as the "directly intended" termination of pregnancy or destruction of a fetus; "contraceptive
practices"; and "direct sterilization"). However, in accordance with the ethical principle of double effect,
the ERDs permit medical interventions whose "direct effect" or "direct purpose" cures or alleviates a
serious pathological condition, even if those interventions have the foreseeable but unintended
consequence of inducing sterility or causing the death of an unborn child. Id at 19.
130. See Debra B. Stulberg et al., Religious Hospitals and Primary Care Physicians: Conflicts
over Policiesfor Patient Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 725, 725 (2010) (surveying 446 general
internists, family physicians, and general practitioners, and finding that among those who had worked
in religiously affiliated institutions, 19% had experienced conflicts regarding clinical treatment and
religiously driven hospital policies).
131. Debra B. Stulberg et al., Obstetrician-Gynecologists,Religious Institutions, and Conflicts
Regarding Patient-CarePolicies, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73.el (2012) (surveying
1,800 OB/GYNs practicing in Catholic, Christian but non-Catholic, Jewish, and other facilities).
132. Id

2020]

THE CONSCIENCEDEFENSETO MALPRACTICE

In another study,
OB/GYNs who currently
understand the types of
included cases in which

1289

the authors conducted qualitative interviews with
practice or have practiced at Catholic hospitals to better
clinical conflicts that can arise.133 Reported conflicts
hospital policies impacted physicians' ability to offer

treatment to patients experiencing obstetric emergencies such as ectopic
pregnancy, molar pregnancy, miscarriage, premature rupture of membranes, and
other pregnancy-related health problems.' 3 4 In such cases, physicians reported

that hospital authorities objected to the standard of care treatment on the grounds
that it equated to abortion.1 35
One physician, for example, drew a direct contrast between how a patient
might be cared for at a Catholic hospital and at a non-denominational hospital.
"Say somebody ruptured their membranes, or . .. had a lethal anomaly, or . .
had no [amniotic] fluid and the prognosis was zero[.] [I]n the non-Catholic
hospital you would just . . put in some medicine to put them through labor, or
do a D&E [dilation and extraction]. And in the Catholic hospital you had to wait
till they get sick, which was kind of foolish when you knew the prognosis was
so poor.",1 36 Another physician, who sought to evacuate the uterus of a patient

experiencing a life-threatening molar pregnancy, was told by the hospital's ethics
committee, "You can't do it here. Take her to another hospital to do it."137 Other
physicians described "stretching the truth" to secure permission to treat patients
at risk before their conditions became life-threatening.138 The authors of the
study concluded that, under the "Catholic bioethical approach, women bear risk
in ways that conflict with the training of . .. physicians .... "139

133.

Lori R. Freedman & Debra B. Stulberg, Conflicts in Carefor Obstetric Complications in

CatholicHospitals, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS PRIMARY RES., no. 4, 2013, at 1.

134. Id at 4-7; see also Angel M. Foster et al., Do Religious Restrictions Influence Ectopic
Pregnancy Management? A National Qualitative Study, 21 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 104 (2011)
(describing findings of a qualitative study of OB/GYNs and emergency medicine physicians, finding
that some Catholic hospitals do not provide women with access to and information about treatment
options for ectopic pregnancy); Lori R. Freedman et al., When There's a Heartbeat: Miscarriage
Management in Catholic-OwnedHospitals, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1774 (2008) (describing findings
of a qualitative survey of OB/GYNs whose medical judgment about the treatment of miscarrying
patients was interfered with by religiously motivated institutional policies); Stulberg et al., supra note
130 (surveying OB/GYNs as to institutional limitations on treatment of ectopic pregnancy with fetal
heart tones present).
135. Freedman & Stulberg, supra note 133, at 6 ("Dr. C took issue with equating the treatment
to an elective abortionbecause this was a deeply desired pregnancy . . They told her, 'We allow women
with ruptured membranes to stay pregnant all the time at 20 weeks.' To which she recalled replying,
'Yes, we do, but even that is not completely standard of care."').
136. Id

137.

Id at 5.

138. Id at 7 ("So, if... normal temperature was 98.6, true infection's probably not [until]
100.6 but . . if they got to 99, we would call it a fever. And we would induce them. Because we were
protecting their life and trying to salvage their uterus, so they didn't get a serious infection, that they
needed a hysterectomy.").
139. Id at 9.
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State laws like those described in Part III protect the rights of religiously
affiliated hospitals to limit the reproductive treatments they offer and often
immunize these hospitals from tort suits for their refusals. Physicians working at
these hospitals report that these institutional limitations prevent them from
providing patients with the best possible care. The proliferation of conscience
laws, therefore, increases the likelihood that patients will have no recourse when
hospitals deny them the treatment that their physicians would offer if not for
institutional policies.
2.

The Effect ofIndividual Conscience on Delivery of Health Care
Services

Studies of physicians' perspectives on conscientious objection suggest that
many physicians prioritize their personal ethical and religious beliefs over
patients' ability to access services and information. While conscientious refusals
among individual providers are less common than among institutional providers,
a substantial percentage of physicians express strong support for rights of

conscientious refusal, particularly in the context of reproductive care. According
to the authors of a 2007 article in the New EnglandJournal ofMedicine, "14%

of patients-more than 40 million Americans-may be cared for by physicians
who do not believe they are obligated to disclose information about medically
available treatments they consider objectionable.",14 0 Additionally, " 2 9 % of
patients-or nearly 100 million Americans-may be cared for by physicians
who do not believe they have an obligation to refer the patient to another provider
for such treatments."141
The most widely-cited findings about the relationship between conscience
and medical practice come from a 2009 study of primary care physicians.1 42 In
this study, 77% of physicians surveyed believed they would have no duty to
perform a legal medical procedure requested by a patient if they objected to that

140. Farr A. Curlin et al., Religion, Conscience, and ControversialClinicalPractices, 356 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 593, 597 (2007) (surveying 2,000 U.S. physicians from all specialties regarding their
willingness to provide information and referrals about services they object to on the grounds of
conscience).
141. Id
142. Ryan E. Lawrence & Farr A. Curlin, Physicians'Beliefs About Conscience in Medicine: A
National Survey, 84 ACAD. MED. 1276 (2009) (surveying 1,000 U.S. primary care physicians). This
study had additional valuable findings, including that many respondents gave contradictory responses
to some questions. For example, 78% of respondents agreed with the following statement: "A physician
should never do what he or she believes is morally wrong, no matter what experts say." Id at 1277.
However, 36% of those respondents who agreed also expressed agreement with an incompatible
statement: "sometimes physicians have a professional ethical obligation to provide medical services
even if they personally believe it would be morally wrong to do so." Id According to the authors of the
study, "we intended the two statements to be incompatible with one another." Id at 1281. The authors
therefore concluded that "42% of primary care physicians believed that physicians are never obligated
to do what they personally believe is wrong; 22% believed that, as professionals, physicians are
sometimes obligated to do what they personally believe is wrong; and 36% held a middle view, in which
they agreed with both [statements]." Id at 1278 (emphasis added).
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procedure for religious or moral reasons.' 43 Another study focusing specifically
on religion in health care found that a majority of physicians would give religious
guidelines at least some weight when making ethically complex decisions about
patient care.1 44 When asked whether patient autonomy should outweigh moral
guidelines from religious traditions when making "ethically complex medical
decisions," 22% of respondents agreed that physicians could refrain from
providing patients with legal medical options that conflicted with their religious
beliefs.1 45 Among physicians with high intrinsic religious motivation, this figure
rose to 37%.146
Physicians are not alone in these perspectives. In a 2012 survey of Idaho

nurses, almost 25% of respondents stated that as a general matter, a nurse's right
to conscientious objection ought to take precedence over a patient's "right to
health care choices."1 47 Among nurses who reported that their ethical beliefs
were primarily driven by religious beliefs, this figure rose to almost 50%.1 48
With respect to referral duties in particular, physician responses are more
varied, particularly depending on their levels of religiosity. A 2009 study found
that most physicians believed they would have a duty to provide a referral for a
medical treatment they opposed on conscience grounds.1 4 9 Only 11% of
physicians believed they would have no duty to refer; 7% were undecided. 50
However, other studies have found greater opposition to referral duties,

143.

Id at 1279. An additional 9% of physicians were undecided. Id
Ryan E. Lawrence & Farr A. Curlin, Autonomy, Religion and Clinical Decisions: Findings
from a NationalPhysician Survey, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 214, 216 (2009) (surveying 1,000 U.S. primary
care physicians). The study found that 47% of physicians would give religious guidelines "some
weight," 16% would give them "a lot of weight," and 5% would give religious guidelines "the highest
possible weight." Id Only 15% disagreed and 7% strongly disagreed with the following statement:
"Physicians should not let their religious beliefs keep them from providing patients legal medical

144.

options." Id
145. Id (finding that 15% of respondents disagreed and 7% strongly disagreed with the statement
that doctors should not let their religious beliefs keep them from providing patients with legal medical
options).
146. Id at 217 (finding that 63% of respondents with high intrinsic religiosity agreed or strongly
agreed with the statement above).
147.
Shoni Davis et al., Influencers of Ethical Beliefs and the Impact on Moral Distress and
Conscientious Objection, 19 NURSING ETHICS 738, 743, 745 (2012) (surveying 1,144 registered nurses
in Idaho).
148. Id at 745. Surprisingly, an even greater number of respondents believed they should have
refusal rights in "a small rural health care setting." Id at 744. The study revealed that 66.4% of all
respondents and 86.9% of religiously-driven respondents concluded that in such settings they should not
have to provide non-emergency medical services that violate their beliefs. Id. at 746. This finding is
particularly striking given that many scholars suggest that the conscience rights of providers in rural
settings should be more limited than the rights of practitioners in settings where patients have greater
alternatives for seeking care. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 20; Robert K. Vischer, IndividualRights vs.
InstitutionalIdentity: The RelationalDimension of Conscience in Health Care, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV.
67, 75 (2011) (arguing that in rural areas, states might be more justified in requiring pharmacies to
dispense contraceptives).
149. Lawrence & Curlin, supra note 144, at 1279.
150. Id
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particularly among physicians for whom religion plays a significant role in their
lives. More recent studies show that between a quarter and a half of surveyed
physicians do not believe they have an ethical duty to refer patients for
objectionable medical treatments.' 5 ' Among highly religious physicians,
opposition to such patient referrals ranges from 44% to 62%. 152
Studies of physicians' perspectives on providing patients with access to

general information about legal but controversial medical procedures also show
support for conscientious refusal. One study found that 14% of physicians across
all specialties were either undecided or believed they would not be obligated to
"present all possible options to the patient, including information about obtaining
the requested procedure" if they objected to that procedure for moral reasons.1 53
Among physicians with high "intrinsic religiosity," 19% believed there was no
such ethical obligation.5 4 Among gynecologic oncologists in particular, 45%
reported that their personal religious and spiritual beliefs "play[ed] a role in the
medical options they offered patients.""5

Other providers of reproductive health services also report that personal
beliefs impact their medical practices in the contexts of abortion, contraception,
and sterilization. For example, the 2007 New EnglandJournalofMedicine study

cited above explored physicians' attitudes about clinical practices including
abortion and prescription of birth control.1 56 A majority of respondents (52%)
reported objection to an abortion resulting from failed contraception."5
Furthermore, 42% of physicians reported objection to prescribing birth control

to an adolescent without parental approval.1 58

151. Compare Curlin et al., supranote 140, at 597-98 (finding that 18% of respondents believed
they had no obligation to refer a patient for a morally objectionable medical treatment while 11% were
undecided), with Michael P. Combs et al., Conscientious Refusals to Refer: Findingsfrom a National
Physician Survey, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 397, 397 (2011) (surveying 2,000 U.S. physicians from all
specialties and finding that 44% of respondents moderately or strongly disagreed with the following
statement: "Physicians have a professional obligation to refer patients for all legal medical services for
which the patients are candidates, even if the physician believes that such a referral is immoral.").
152.
Compare Curlin et al., supra note 140, at 598 (finding that 56% of physicians with high
"intrinsic religiosity" believe there is an obligation to refer), with Combs et al., supra note 151, at 399
(finding that among physicians who identified religion as a "very important" part of their lives, 48%
agreed that they are obligated to provide a referral even if they believe that referral is immoral, and
among those for whom religion was "the most important" part of their lives, 38% agreed).
153. Curlin et al., supra note 140, at 597-98 (finding that 8% of respondents said they were not
obligated to give information and that 6% were undecided).
154. See id. at 595, 597-98 (finding that 81% of respondents with high "intrinsic religiosity"
defined as "the extent to which a person embraces his or her religion as the 'master motive' that guides
and gives meaning to his or her life" agreed that they had an obligation to disclose all options).
155. Lois Ramondetta et al., Religious and Spiritual Beliefs of Gynecologic Oncologists May
Influence Medical DecisionMaking, 21 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGICAL CANCER 573, 573 (2011) (surveying

1,972 members of the International Gynecologic Oncologists Society and the Society of Gynecologic
Oncologists).
156. Curin et al., supranote 140, at 596.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Rates of conscientious objection to reproductive health care services tend
to be lower among OB/GYNs and others who regularly provide such services
(e.g., pharmacists who dispense contraceptives). Thus, patients are probably less

likely to be denied services when they seek treatment from such providers, as
compared to general practitioners or other providers who rarely encounter
patients

seeking reproductive

care. However, even some providers who

specialize in reproductive care maintain conscience-based objections to some
services. In a 2011 study of U.S. OB/GYNs' perspectives on contraception and

sterilization, 4.9% reported having a moral or ethical objection to at least one
contraceptive method, and 6.8% said they would not offer one or more
contraceptive methods to patients who requested them.1 59 Another study found
that 6% of OB/GYNs would not offer emergency contraception to anyone under
any circumstances.1 60 Another 6 % would only offer it to victims of sexual
assault.161 Rates of refusal were higher among doctors who "consider religion
the most important part of their lives," 36% of whom reported that they would
never offer emergency contraception, or would offer it only in cases of sexual
assault.1 62 Rates of objection among pharmacists are also noteworthy. A 2008

survey of Nevada pharmacists found that 7.5% would refuse to dispense
emergency contraception and 1 7 .2 % would refuse to dispense medical
abortifacients.163

In demonstrating the prevalence of health care providers with absolute
objections to specific medical services, these studies support the claim that
patients are impacted by conscience-based denials of care, particularly when
those denials are protected by law.

159. Ryan F. Lawrence et al., Obstetrician-Gynecologists'Views on Contraceptionand Natural
Family Planning:A NationalSurvey, 204 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 124.e1, 124.e3 (2011)
(surveying 1,800 OB/GYNs). The most common objections were to "intrauterine devices (4.4% object,
3.6% would not offer), followed by progesterone implants and/or injections (1.7% object, 2.1% would
not offer), tubal ligations (1.5% object, 1.5% would not offer), oral contraceptive pills (1.3% object,
1.1% would not offer), condoms (1.3% object, 1.8% would not offer), and the diaphragm or cervical
cap with spermicide (1.3% object, 3.3% would not offer)." 1.1% of surveyed physicians had a moral or
ethical objection to all six contraceptives.
160. Ryan F. Lawrence et al., Obstetrician Gynecologist Physicians'Beliefs about Emergency
Contraception:A NationalSurvey, 82 CONTRACEPTION 324, 329 (2010) (surveying 1,800 OB/GYNs).
161. Id
162. Id at 327. The authors note that while "nonprescription availability [of emergency
contraception] makes adult women less dependent on a physician's prescription than in years past,
studies repeatedly show that some women do not know about [emergency contraception], and even wellinformed patients still rely on their physician's advice." Id at 329.
163. Laura A. Davidson et al., Religion and Conscientious Objection: A Survey of Pharmacists'
Willingness to DispenseMedications, 71 SOC. SCI. & MED. 161, 163 (2010) (surveying 668 pharmacists
in Nevada). Of the 7. 5 % who would refuse to dispense emergency contraception, 2 . 3 % would also
2
refuse to transfer the patient's prescription. Id Of the 17. % who would refuse to dispense medical
abortifacients, 5. 9 % would also refuse to transfer the prescription. Id Respondents also reported
objections to erectile dysfunction drugs (1.7%); infertility drugs (1.4%); and oral contraceptives (0.5%).
Id
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Some conscience-based objections are more situational, however, which
makes it far more difficult to track their prevalence. Thus, some researchers have
used vignette-based studies to assess the impact of conscience on the delivery of
health care services in particular contexts. One study demonstrated that the
reason for a patient's request dramatically impacts providers' willingness to
provide the service.' 64 For example, only 16% of respondents held moral
objections to abortion in the case of a twenty-four-year-old with "a
cardiopulmonary abnormality associated with a 25% chance of death with
gestation."1 65 However, 82% objected in the case of a thirty-eight-year-old with
"five daughters and no sons" who was pregnant with a "chromosomally normal
female."1 66 In a scenario that OB/GYNs likely encounter more frequently-that
of a "22-[year]-old single woman 6 [weeks] pregnant after failed hormonal
contraception"-41% of respondents objected to abortion; nevertheless, 85%
said they would "help the patient obtain an abortion if asked," either by providing
a referral or performing the abortion themselves.1 67
Another vignette-based study evaluated OB/GYNs' perspectives about
whether conscientious refusal would be "appropriate" in various contexts.1 68
Respondents were presented with a scenario in which a physician
conscientiously refused to provide an elective abortion to a twenty-three-yearold single graduate student who was eight weeks pregnant.1 69 The researchers
found that overall, 43% of respondents agreed that "the conscientious refusal
exercised by the vignette physician was very or somewhat appropriate."'

Taken together, these data indicate that many health care providers hold
conscientious beliefs that impact their willingness to participate in, inform
patients about, or refer patients for abortion and other reproductive health

164.

Lisa H. Harris et al., Obstetrician Gynecologists' Objections to and Willingness to Help

Patients Obtain an Abortion, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 905 (2011) (surveying 1,800

OB/GYNs about how their conscientious beliefs might impact their responses to patient requests for
treatment). The vignettes involved a variety of circumstances in which women might seek abortion:
failed contraception, fetal sex selection, breast cancer, difficult-to-control diabetes, rape, selective
reduction, and cardiopulmonary disease. Id at 906. The authors concluded that their findings "contrast
with public debates about the ethics of abortion, which often focus only on the moral status of the fetus:
if the fetus is considered a person, then abortion is the moral equivalent of murder; if the fetus is not
considered a person, then abortion may be permissible." Id at 909.
165. Id at 908.
166. Id
167. Id Of those who held moral objections to abortion, around two-thirds of respondents
reported that they would nevertheless help the patient "in the case of failed contraception." Id
168. Kenneth A. Rasinski et al., Obstetrician-Gynaecologists'Opinions About Conscientious
Refusal ofaRequestforAbortion:Resultsfrom a NationalVignette Experiment, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 711

(2011) (surveying 1,800 OB/GYNs).
169. Id at 711-12.
170. Id Variations of the scenario contrasted physicians who did and did not provide a referral
to the patient and physicians who did or did not disclose the reason for their objection. 70% of
respondents expressed approval of the vignette physician who provided a referral. Id at 713. 54%
approved of the physician who did not disclose the reason for his objection. Id 88% approved of the
physician who both provided a referral and did not disclose the reason for his objection. Id
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services. Given that nearly every U.S. state grants providers a right to decline to
participate in abortion, millions of patients may be affected by these refusals. In
most states, a patient has no legal remedy if that refusal violates the standard of
care.
B.

Some PatientsSuffer Serious Compensable Injuries as a Result of
Conscience-driven Refusals

Conscientious refusals to provide reproductive health services can result in
serious injuries to some patients. A vast body of scholarship has investigated and
documented the harms that patients can suffer when they are denied access to
medical services as a result of health care providers' exercise of conscience
rights.' 7 ' Because patients can suffer serious harms as a result of at least some
denials of reproductive care, civil immunity provisions in state conscience laws
have a meaningful impact on tort recovery.
Patients may experience a broad spectrum of consequences when a health
care provider declines to provide a service for reasons of conscience. In the most
challenging cases, a patient may be unable to access the needed service. Reasons
for inaccessibility may include geographic restrictions, insurance limitations,
immediacy of need, or because the patient has not been informed that the service
is medically appropriate and available elsewhere. 7 2 Of course, when an

institutional provider has established effective policies to ensure patient access
in cases of individual provider objection, the patient may experience no direct
harm. Indeed, if the institutional process is seamless enough, the patient may not
even be aware that a conscience-driven refusal has occurred. 73 But even when
the patient is aware that their provider has refused to provide a service on grounds
of conscience and is still able to access that service elsewhere, she may
nevertheless suffer dignitary harms i74 or inconvenience in accessing services
elsewhere.? 5 Because it is not clear whether these types of harms would be

171. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 51, at 97-99 (describing the "range of consequences, from
mere inconvenience to . . serious adverse health outcomes" that may result from delays in securing
reproductive health services that have been refused on grounds of conscience).
172. See id at 128.
173.

See HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE (2008)

(arguing for institutional solutions to resolve access problems relating to individual providers'
conscientious objections).
174. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2576-77 (2015) (arguing that patients can suffer
serious dignitary harms as a result of conscience-driven denials of care).
175. See Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: PharmacistRights and the ErodingMoral
Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 83, 113 (2006) (arguing that there is a legally relevant
distinction between inconvenience and true lack of access); Wilson, The Limits of Conscience, supra
note 32, 52-54 (arguing, in the context of emergency contraception, that allowing providers to exercise
conscience rights will not result in an "access crisis," and challenging the claim that patients should be
protected from "even the smallest inconvenience in obtaining contraceptives").
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compensable as a matter of law, 7 6 the impact of civil immunity laws is likely to
be greater when denials of care result in physical injury.
Whether a provider's conscience-based refusal delays a patient's access to
services or prevents her from receiving care entirely, the range of harms suffered
can vary widely depending on the context in which the refusal occurs. Denial of
access to contraception, emergency contraception, or abortion may result in an
unwanted pregnancy.' 77 Denial of access to assisted reproductive technology

services such as in vitro fertilization may result in an inability to conceive a
much-wanted child.' Denial of access to termination of pregnancy in cases
where continuation of pregnancy is dangerous may result in serious physical

injury or even death.' 7 9 Indeed, there are many examples of patients, like
Tamesha Means, who experience grievous physical harms as a result of denial
of access to appropriate miscarriage management by religious hospitals and

health care providers. "s

176.
While tort law does compensate for some dignitary harms, numerous scholars have
criticized the fact that there is no coherent tort theory for the protection of dignitary interests. See, e.g.,
Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
317, 317 (2019) (describing "[t]he absence of a robustly-articulated conception of the interest in dignity
that tort law protects" as "puzzling"); Stephen D. Sugarman and Caitlin Boucher, Re-Imagining the
Dignitary Torts 1 (Sept. 17, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3450107 [https://perma.cc/2W5A-4VLU]
(pointing out "unjustified inconsistencies" in tort law's approach to dignitary torts, and arguing for a
more unified theory).
177.
There is a strong foundation in contemporary common law for claims of "wrongful
conception" and "wrongful pregnancy." These causes of action arise where a provider's malpractice in
dispensing contraception, diagnosing pregnancy, performing sterilization, orperforming abortion results
in the conception or birth of an unwanted child. See Dov Fox, Essay, Reproductive Negligence, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 166 (2017) (describing judicial recognition of "wrongful pregnancy" claims,
where parents of an unwanted but healthy child are granted recovery for the costs of gestation and
delivery - and, in rare cases, the costs of child-rearing); Gast, supranote 93, at 174 (noting that wrongful
conception is a valid cause of action, but finding no case law alleging wrongful conception as a result of
a conscience-based refusal to dispense emergency contraception). That said, some courts have argued
that the birth of an unwanted child does not constitute a legally cognizable injury. See, e.g., FultonDeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1984) (stating that where a negligently
performed sterilization procedure resulted in the conception and birth of a child with a club foot, "[w]e
instinctively recoil from the notion that parents may suffer a compensable injury on the birth of a child").
178. See, e.g., Benitez v. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 36768 (Ct. App. 2003) (alleging common law claims against health care providers who refused to provide
the plaintiff with fertility treatments on the basis of her sexual orientation); see also Fox, supranote 177,
at 193-200 (discussing cases grounded in negligent denial of the opportunity to procreate).
179. See infra Part IV.C.
180.
Several recent reports on denials of care at Catholic hospitals highlight cases in which
miscarrying patients suffered hemorrhaging, infection, and even death as a result of being denied access
to emergency termination of pregnancy. See, e.g., JULIA KAYE ET AL., ACLU, HEALTH CARE DENIED:
PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS SPEAK OUT ABOUT CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO
WOMEN'S
HEALTH
AND
LIVES
(2016),

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/healthcaredenied.pdf_[https://perma.cc/27FXNYKM]; NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., supranote 14; UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 127 (describing
the growth of Catholic hospitals since 2013); Lois UTTLEY ET AL., ACLU & MERGERWATCH,
MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO

THE CONSCIENCEDEFENSETO MALPRACTICE

2020 ]

1297

Thus, while some patients may experience no adverse consequences as a

result of a provider's exercise of conscience, there are some cases where a
conscience-driven denial unquestionably resulted in serious patient injury. While
such injuries would ordinarily be compensable under tort law, state conscience
laws with civil immunity clauses eliminate the possibility of tort recovery in
these cases.
C.

Refusal to Provide Services May Constitute a Breach of Duty

Even where injury can be proven, a patient seeking tort recovery must prove

negligent conduct on the part of the health care provider. In cases of medical
malpractice or general negligence against health care institutions, plaintiffpatients must successfully demonstrate that the provider's action or inaction
violated the standard of care.
One of the most common arguments among supporters of strong conscience

protections is that conscience-based denials of reproductive health services do
not violate the standard of care because physicians are under no legal duty to
provide these services.18' Indeed, there is no generally established "duty to treat"
under common law. First, a physician has no duty accept a patient with whom
they have no pre-existing treatment relationship. 8 2 In the context of an existing
treatment relationship, a physician has no duty to comply with a patient's request

for a service that falls outside the standard of care or is not medically
appropriate. 183 Finally, a physician has the right to withdraw from an existing
treatment relationship after giving the patient reasonable notice.84
But as I have argued elsewhere, "there is no question that abortion,
sterilization, and contraception . . fall within the scope of treatments that
reasonably competent physicians might offer in some circumstances."1 85 Under
such circumstances, failure to offer those services-or at the very least, failure

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/growth-of-catholic-hospitals2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L8W-ZY94] (first version of the 2016 UTTLEY & KHAIKIN report, supra
note 127).
181. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 64, at 782, 801-04 (describing the absence of a common
law "duty to treat," and recognizing that "a health care professional is free to define the parameters of
his or her practice and may refuse to provide services to prospective patients"); Maureen Kramlich,
Coercing Conscience: The Effort to Mandate Abortion as a Standard of Care, 4 NAT'L CATHOLIC

BIOETHICS Q. 29 (2004) (stating that there is "no duty in either law or medical ethics for health care
providers to participate in abortion").
182. FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 72, 278.
183. Id. at 964-65 (explaining that physicians have no duty to provide treatments that are not
medically indicated under the circumstances).
184. Id. at 73.
185.
Sawicki, supra note 51, at 91 (footnotes omitted); see also Tracy A. Weitz & Susan Berke
Fogel, The Denial ofAbortion Care Information, Referrals, and Services Undermines Quality Carefor
U.S. Women, 20 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 7, 8 (2010) (recognizing that althoughthe phrase "'`standard
of care' is also used in the medical liability context to assess liability," from a medical perspective
"standards of care . . are discussed in the context of what care patients should expect given the
prevailing medical knowledge").
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to inform a patient that those services may be medically appropriate-would
indeed violate the common law standard of care.1 86
For example, physicians and medical organizations widely recognize that
abortion is a medically appropriate-and sometimes medically necessaryintervention in some high-risk pregnancies.1 87 Termination of pregnancy may be

considered the standard of care in cases where the pregnant patient is suffering
from cardiovascular diseases, including cyanotic congenital heart disease, severe
pulmonary hypertension, or aortic root enlargement.1

88

In cases of preeclampsia

and eclampsia, the only treatment is delivery of the pregnancy, and "abortion[]
is usually suggested regardless of fetal age or potential for survival."1 89 Patients
who are experiencing inevitable miscarriage (for example, as a result of
premature rupture of membranes) face a risk of sepsis, hemorrhage, or even
death; appropriate medical management of this condition may include
termination of pregnancy and uterine evacuation.190 And as noted above,
providers practicing in Catholic hospitals report that some hospital policies
prohibiting termination of pregnancy interfere with their medical judgment and

violate the standard of care. 191
Moreover, in cases where termination of pregnancy is one option among

many a patient might choose from, the common law of informed consent requires
disclosure of this option. 192 Even if providers have no affirmative duty to
participate in the performance of an abortion, they have a clear common law

186. See Sawicki, supra note 51, at 106-07.
187. Freedman et al., supranote 134 at 1775 ("According to the generally accepted standards of
care in miscarriage management, abortion is medically indicated under certain circumstances in the
presence of fetal heart tones[,] [including in cases of] first-trimester septic or inevitable miscarriage,
previable premature rupture of membranes and chorioamnionitis, and situations in which continuation
of the pregnancy significantly threatens the life or health of the woman."); Freedman & Stulberg, supra
note 133, at 7-8 (describing findings of a study in which physicians considered termination of pregnancy
to be "standard and morally acceptable treatment for women with these pregnancy complications");
Weitz & Fogel, supra note 185, at 8 ("Although most often associated with factors related to an
unintended pregnancy, abortion care is also needed for women with medical or fetal complications
associated with a wanted or intended pregnancy.")
188.
Weitz & Fogel, supra note 185, at 9.
189. Id.
190. NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 2 (reporting "disturbing examples of
treatment practices that increase the odds of medical complications that place women's lives and health
at risk," and noting that in such cases, "immediate uterine evacuation reduces the patient's risk of
complications, including blood loss, hemorrhage, infection, and the loss of future fertility[;] [a] delay in
treatment may subject a woman to unnecessary blood transfusions, risk of infection, hysterectomy or
even death" (footnotes omitted)). See generally Sawicki, supra note 51, at 98 (collecting sources).
191. See supraPart IV.A.1.
192.
While disclosure duties vary somewhat depending on whether a state has adopted a patientbased or physician-based standard of informed consent, there is "widespread agreement" across both
types of jurisdictions that the scope of informed consent disclosure must include "substantive
information about the patient's diagnosis and proposed treatment; the treatment's risks and benefits;
alternative procedures and their risks and benefits; and the risks and benefits of taking no action." Nadia
N. Sawicki, ModernizingInformed Consent: Expanding the Boundariesof~fateriality, 2016 U. ILL. L.
REv. 821, 831, 833 (emphasis added).
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duty, and often a statutory duty, to disclose it as one of the range of possible
treatments; such disclosure requires describing, at the very least, the procedure's
risks and benefits.1 93 The Means case,1 94 the Brownfield case,1 95 and many others
reported in the media offer examples of cases where patients have been denied
reproductive services and key medical information about the benefits of those
services and their availability elsewhere.1 96
Some states have passed legislation that explicitly establishes treatment
duties in specific contexts to avoid ambiguities and conflicts about the scope of
providers' treatment obligations. These laws include state analogues of the

193. See Rich, supra note 10, at 226 ("[T]here is both a professional and moral obligation to
provide adequate notice to prospective patients as to what clinical services that they might desire or
require will notbe provided."); Sawicki, supra note 51, at 114 ("If a patient might have abetter medical
outcome by seeking care from another physician or another healthcare institution, the availability of
those options would seem to fall squarely within the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure requirement
that physicians disclose material medical risks and available alternatives."); see also Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Op. 385 (2007, reaffirmed 2013),
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/TheLimits-of-Conscientious-Refusal-in-Reproductive-Medicine
[https://perma.cc/63GK-R4WT]
(recommending that members of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists provide their
patients with "accurate and unbiased information," including "scientifically accurate and professionally
accepted characterizations of reproductive health services"); Comm. on Bioethics, Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, Policy Statement PhysicianRefusal to Provide Information of Treatment on the Basis of
Claimsof Conscience, 124 PEDIATRICS 1689, 1689 (2009) (requiring physicians to disclose "all relevant
and legally available treatment options, including options to which they object"); BJ Crigger et al.,
Report by the American MedicalAssociation's Council on Ethical andJudicialAffairs on Physicians'
Exercise of Conscience, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 219, 220 (requiring that physicians disclose to potential
patients any interventions they cannot in good conscience provide).
194.
Complaint at 2, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 1:15-CV-353, 2015
WL 3970046 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2015) (stating that the Conference for Catholic Bishops and others
implement directives that "cause pregnant women who are suffering from a miscarriage to be denied
appropriate medical care, including information about their condition and treatment options"), aff'd, 836
F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016).
195. Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Ct. App. 1989)
("[W]hen... a skilled practitioner of good standing would have provided [a rape victim] with
information concerning and access to estrogen pregnancy prophylaxis under similar
circumstances . . and . . damages have proximately resulted from the failure to provide her with
information concerning this treatment option, [she] can state a cause of action for damages for medical
malpractice." (footnote omitted)).
196.
JULIA KAYE ET AL., supra note 180, at 7 (highlighting that Catholic hospitals follow
directives that "prohibit a range of reproductive health services, including contraception, sterilization,
many infertility treatments, and abortion"); UTTLEY & KHAIIN, supra note 127, at 1 (finding that the
growth of Catholic hospitals is adversely affecting women's ability to obtain reproductive health
services); UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 180, at 14-15 (describing case studies of negative patient
outcomes arising from restrictions in Catholic-affiliated consequences).
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federal Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act,1 97 pharmacy mandates,1 98
and laws requiring emergency rooms to offer emergency contraception to rape

victims ("EC in the ER laws").1 99 Such statutes clearly signal legislative intent
to ensure patient access to important medical services by compelling physicians,

pharmacists, and hospitals to provide these services. The existence of such a
statute would, therefore, strengthen a patient's claim that a conscience-based
denial of service constituted a breach of duty.
Disappointingly, no court has addressed head-on the issue of how to
interpret a duty-to-treat law that conflicts with a state conscience law. 200 It
remains unclear whether, in cases of conflict, courts would place more emphasis
on ensuring that providers are held to an appropriate standard of care or on
protecting their right of conscientious refusal. While litigants have brought such
claims to court,20' no court has yet ruled on the substantive issue of whether a
provider's conscientious refusal to terminate a pregnancy outweighs the
obligation to comply with the standard of care.20 2
Although not every conscience-based denial of reproductive treatment is a
deviation from the medical standard of care, it is clear that at least in some cases,

197. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide
Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21, 53-54 (1989) (noting that almost half of all states have laws
"requiring hospitals to provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay, some requiring that patients
be in stable condition before transferto another hospital").

198.

HENRY J KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FACT SHEET: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION 6 (2018),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/emergency-contraception-fact-sheet
[https://penna.cc/Y4BP-7596]
(identifying four states with laws requiring pharmacies or pharmacists to fill all valid prescriptions, and
noting that these laws were "enacted, in part, as responses to reports of pharmacists refusing to fill
prescriptions for EC pills because they oppose its use on moral or religious grounds").
199. Id. at 5 (identifying thirteen states and the District of Columbia with laws requiring that
emergency room staff provide female victims of sexual assault with emergency contraception).
200. The one case that might be instructive considered an alleged conflict between a federal law
prohibiting government discrimination against refusing providers and a state emergency treatment law.
California v. United States, No. C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008).
Although the case might have been resolved on preemption grounds to favor the federal conscience law,
the court instead took a statutory interpretation approach to conclude that that "[t]here is no clear
indication" that California's enforcement of its emergency treatment law in cases of medically necessary
abortions would be considered "discrimination" under the Weldon Amendment. Id.
201. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Trinity Health Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 614
(E.D. Mich. 2016) (alleging that as a result of hospital policies under the USCCB Directives, hospitals
have "repeatedly and systematically failed to provide women suffering pregnancy
complications . . with the emergency care required by EMTALA and the Rehabilitation Act," and that
as a result, women "have become septic, experienced hemorrhaging, contracted life-threatening
infections, and/or unnecessarily suffered severe pain for several days at a time"); Complaint at 8, Means
v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 1:15-CV-353, 2015 WL 3970046 (W.D. Mich. June 30,
2015), aff'd, 836 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016).
202. See Trinity Health, 178 F. Supp. 3d 614 (granting motion to dismiss, without prejudice, on
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing and the suit was not ripe for review), reconsideration
denied, No. 15-cv-12611, 2016 WL 4267825 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2016) (denying plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration, but noting thatplaintiffs are free to file a new complaint); Means, 2015 WL 3970046
(granting a motion to dismiss by defendant U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops on the grounds that it
owed no duty to the plaintiff).
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patients will be able to prove that such a denial constitutes a breach of duty.
Therefore, civil immunity provisions in conscience statutes will deprive these
patients of recovery they would otherwise have under common law.
D. EMTALA Is Not a Sufficient Alternate Remedy

Finally, critics may argue that even if state conscience laws deprive injured
patients of common law tort remedies, this is not a dramatic loss because patients
have an alternative mechanism for recovery through the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). 20 3 It is true that some patients who

have suffered injuries as a result of a provider's conscience-driven refusal during
an emergency may be able to recover under EMTALA. However, EMTALA's

civil remedy provision is by no means a panacea for all injuries resulting from a
conscience-driven denial of care.
EMTALA requires Medicare-funded hospitals with emergency
departments to screen patients seeking emergency treatment. Under EMTALA,

hospitals must assess whether patients have an emergency medical condition and
ensure that patients with such a condition are stabilized before being transferred
to another hospital. 20 4 Hospitals and physicians that fail to comply with
EMTALA are subject to monetary penalties imposed by the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services. 205 More importantly for purposes of this discussion,
hospitals are subject to civil liability to patients who are injured as a result of
EMTALA non-compliance. 206 However, many conscience-driven denials of care

are likely to fall through the gaps of EMTALA's narrow legal requirements.
First and most importantly, EMTALA, which was passed in 1986 to

address "hospital dumping" of uninsured patients, 207 is a statute that guarantees
access to basic screening-not quality of care. Numerous courts have held that a
hospital does not violate EMTALA as long as the hospital follows its standard
internal procedures regarding screening and stabilization in a non-discriminatory

203.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (2018).

204. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c). EMTALA also identifies a narrow set of circumstances where it is
permissible for a hospital to transfer a patient that has not been stabilized: where the patient requests
transfer, the treating physician has certified in writing that the medical benefits of transfer likely
outweigh the risks, the receiving facility has the capacity to accept the patient and has agreed to accept
the transfer, and the discharging facility sends all relevant medical records to the receiving hospital. Id
205. See 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d)(1).
206. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d)(2)(A) ("Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result
of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the
participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in
which the hospital is located .... "). Note that this provision does not establish civil liability for
individual physicians.
207. At the time of EMTALA's passage, patient dumping was a "widespread practice" whereby
hospitals driven by financial incentives transferred uninsured patients seeking emergency treatment to
other (typically public) hospitals. FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 279.
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fashion. 208 EMTALA protects against differential treatment; it does not protect
patients from screening or treatment that might be considered negligent under
state malpractice law. 209 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has explained that
"[e]very circuit . . is in accord" in holding that EMTALA "was not enacted to
establish a federal medical malpractice cause of action nor to establish a national
standard of care." 210 The Fifth Circuit has described EMTALA's requirement
that hospitals provide an "appropriate medical screening examination" as being
"not judged by its proficiency in accurately diagnosing the patient's illness, but
rather by whether it was performed equitably in comparison to other patients
with similar symptoms." 2 11 Therefore, since EMTALA does not establish a
medical standard of care, patients harmed by a conscience-driven refusal but
treated in accordance with the hospital's standard policies are not able to sue.
For example, if a Catholic hospital's policies prohibit termination of pregnancy
even in cases of medical emergency, the hospital's compliance with its internal
policy will very likely shield it from EMTALA liability.
Moreover, even if EMTALA were construed to establish a federal standard
of care for emergency screening and treatment, only two reproductive care
scenarios seem as if they might potentially fall within its scope: denial of
emergency contraception, and denial of access to medically necessary abortion.
With respect to emergency contraception, it is difficult to see how a
hospital's refusal would violate the requirements of EMTALA and entitle a
patient to recovery. EMTALA requires that patients seeking emergency

treatment be screened for emergency medical conditions. 212 However, a patient's
need for emergency contraception, while very real, is unlikely to qualify as:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-(i) placing the health of the individual . . in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction
of any bodily organ or part.213

208. See 62 AM. JUR. Trials 119 § 5 (2020) ("Establishing a violation of the EMTALA screening
provisions generally requires proof that the defendant did not provide the same screening in the
plaintiff's case that it routinely provided for other patients with comparable symptoms.").
209. FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 72, 284-85. Only in the most egregious cases, where "an
examination [is] so cursory as to amount to no exam at all," would EMTALA potentially be implicated.
Id at 285-86.
210. Bryant v. Adventist Health Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002).
211. Marshall v. E. Carroll Par. Hosp. Serw. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1998).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018).
213. See id § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
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Indeed, at least one court has found that a patient's need for emergency
contraception does not qualify as an "emergency" under a state conscience law's
emergency treatment requirement.214

Moreover, even in the unlikely scenario that the need for emergency
contraception fell within the statutory definition of an emergency medical
condition, the hospital's obligation under EMTALA requires it to provide only
medical treatment with a stabilizing effect. 215 Specifically, the hospital must
"provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure,
within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the
condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility." 216 While the need for emergency contraception is very timesensitive,217 the patient is unlikely to suffer "material deterioration of [a]
condition" 218 in the course of transfer to another facility.
Patients seeking medically necessary abortions have a right of recovery
under EMTALA only in limited situations. EMTALA would likely provide some
protection for patients suffering from "acute symptoms of sufficient severity" 2 19
that are likely to result in serious bodily harm if not stabilized. 22 However, this
protection would by no means extend to all medically necessary abortions, but
only those where the patient arrives at an emergency room in critical condition.
For patients suffering from conditions like preeclampsia or heart disease, for
example, abortion may be medically appropriate but not a procedure that needs
to be done on an emergency basis.
EMTALA offers no remedy for all other denials of reproductive care that
might violate medical standards of care and result in patient injury. EMTALA
would not, for example, allow a cause of action by a sexually active patient who
became pregnant because their OB/GYN was not willing to discuss
contraception, or because the patient was unable to secure emergency
contraception due to a provider's refusal. EMTALA would not offer a remedy to
a patient with a non-emergent but health-threatening pregnancy who could not
terminate the pregnancy because all the health care providers in their area
opposed abortion. Likewise, EMTALA would not protect a pregnant patient who

214. See, e.g., Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 976 N.E.2d 1160, 1175 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (concluding
that "'emergency contraceptives' do not fall within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
'emergency"' in the Illinois Conscience Act's emergency treatment requirement).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(a).
216. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3).
217. Emergency contraception needs to be taken within five days of unprotected sex; it is most
effective, however, within twenty-four hours, and its effectiveness drops dramatically over time. See
Roey M. Malleson, Emergency Contraception:A Simple, Safe, and Effective Approach to Preventing
PregnancyAfter UnprotectedIntercourse, 44 B.C. MED. J. 30 (2002).
218. § 1395dd(e)(3).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
220. Amended Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Trinity Health Corp., 178 F. Supp. 3d 614 (E.D. Mich.
2016) (alleging EMTALA violations by Trinity Health against women suffering "pregnancy
complications"); see conditions described supra Parts V.B.1, .2.
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was not offered genetic testing for fetal anomalies because the physician believed
the patient might choose to abort.
In sum, EMTALA is not an effective alternative to tort law for addressing
patient harms resulting from conscience-based refusals in reproductive health
contexts. When states pass conscience laws that protect refusing providers from
civil liability under state tort law, most patients cannot rely on EMTALA as an
alternate remedy.
V.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

These new insights into the details of conscience protections relating to
reproductive health services offer scholars and policy-makers an opportunity to
revisit the debates surrounding law's role in protecting health care providers'
rights of conscience. In particular, the data presented in this Article calls into
question whether granting refusing providers absolute (or near-absolute)
immunity from civil liability is the best way of balancing conscience rights with
state interests in protecting patient health and safety. For reasons I have
explained in other work'221 policy-makers may find that these interests are better
balanced by protecting providers from professional discrimination and
discipline, but not immunizing them from liability for patient injury. These are

challenging policy decisions that require further exploration. Below, I describe
some possible directions for future research.
A.

EmpiricalResearch: Conscience Protections in Other Health Care
Contexts

The research described in this Article is the first step in a larger legislative
tracking project of procedural protections in health care conscience laws. As
noted earlier, some states have laws that establish protections for health care
providers' conscience-driven conduct in any context, without limiting those
protections to refusals for specific categories of health care services.
Furthermore, many states have laws protecting providers who decline to comply
with patient or family requests in the end-of-life care context. 222 Conscience-

driven refusals in this context may include providers' unwillingness to comply
with a patient's advance directive or a health care surrogate's decision regarding
provision or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment; they can also include an
unwillingness to participate in a patient's request for aid in dying. 223 Finally,

federal health care conscience laws that establish protections from employment

221. Sawicki, supra note 21.
222. Pope, supra note 36, at 165-67 (describing federal and state laws granting rights to refuse
life-sustaining treatment for reasons of conscience).
223. See Marc R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AT THE
END OF LIFE 87, 88-91 (Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold eds., 2016) (describing various types
of conscience claims in end-of-life care).
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discrimination and other adverse action ought to be considered in any survey of
health care conscience protections. 224
The next step in this project will be to track these other health care
conscience laws and compare the types of procedural protections they offer. For
example, in the end-of-life care context, conscience laws often impose
significant limitations on providers' rights of refusal and civil immunitylimitations that do not exist in reproductive conscience laws. In many states,
health care providers who are unwilling to comply with a patient's request
relating to life-sustaining treatment (whether a request for continuation or for
withdrawal of such treatment) have a statutory obligation to facilitate transfer of
the patient to a provider who will comply with the request. 225 Others require that
providers with conscientious objections to what they consider to be "futile" or
medically inappropriate care continue to provide these treatments until the
patient is successfully transferred. 226 If these patterns turn out to be consistent
across states with end-of-life conscience laws, they will prompt consideration of
why these laws impose more patient-protective conditions on provider rights as
compared to laws applicable in reproductive contexts. Likewise, federal
conscience laws seem to establish a narrower scope of procedural protections
than do state conscience laws. 227 Researchers may wish to consider why state
laws establish broader protections than federal law, and whether such variability
is justified.
B.

Policy Analyses of ProceduralProtectionsin Conscience Laws

Because the procedural protections states establish for refusing providers
differ in concrete ways, these protections ought to be independently analyzed on
policy grounds. 228 For example, there may be different reasons for protecting

providers from adverse action by public actors such as criminal prosecutors,
medical licensing boards, and administrative agencies, as opposed to private

224. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2018) (prohibiting some entities receiving federal
funding from "discriminat[ing] in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of... [or]
discriminat[ing] in the extension of staff or other privileges to" individual providers on the basis of their
conscientious beliefs about abortion or sterilization).
225. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-30-12(b) (2020) (conditioning an individual healthcare
provider's right to not comply with a patient's healthcare decision on the provider's cooperation in
transferring the patient).
226. See, e.g., Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-215(7) (2013) (conditioning an individual health care
provider's right not to comply with a patient's health care decision on the provider's assistance with the
transfer and continuation of care until an effective transfer occurs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(2)
(2019) (same).
227. For example, federal conscience protections in the reproductive health context do not
explicitly protect providers from civil liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a) (2018) (prohibiting the federal
government from discriminating against health care entities for refusals in the abortion context); id. §
300a-7 (prohibiting public entities from requiring health care providers to participate in abortion, or
discriminating against them on the basis of their religious or moral convictions regarding abortion).
228. Sawicki, supranote 21, at 17-18.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1306

[Vol. 108:1255

actors like private employers and patients.229 Likewise, laws that immunize
providers from adverse action even when their conduct causes injury are likely
to require stronger policy justifications than protections against adverse action

on the basis of a provider's beliefs or non-harm-causing conduct.230
Further exploration is necessary to evaluate unrestricted civil immunity
provisions.

Do

these provisions strike the appropriate balance between

protecting providers' right to refuse services on grounds of conscience and
protecting patients' right to tort recovery when they are injured as a result of such
refusal? If the answer is no, we ought to consider alternatives to the current
system, in which individual and institutional health care providers in most states
have absolute civil immunity. Eliminating protections from civil liability would
be one obvious solution, but there may be others. For example, states could
amend their conscience laws to limit civil immunity in cases of malpractice. This
would ensure patients have a right to tort recovery when their providers breach
the standard of care. Emergency exceptions might also protect patients' right to

tort recovery, albeit in the more limited context of denial of emergency
treatment. Alternatively, states may decide to establish some alternative means
of patient recovery, such as a no-fault compensation system similar to that used
in the context of workplace injury.231 Or, rather than focusing on patient
remedies, states could address patient access by strengthening institutional
providers' obligations to ensure services that individual physicians may be
unwilling to offer.

A second question to consider is what implications we might draw from the
fact that conscience protections in the reproductive health care context are more
extensive than those established by other comparable laws that protect
individuals on the basis of their beliefs or personal characteristics.232 These
include the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
and the Military Selective Service Act, among others. In contrast to health care
conscience laws, these laws recognize that protections for qualified individuals
cannot impose absolute unilateral burdens on employers or others who may be
adversely impacted. 233 In these contexts, federal laws establish meaningful

229. See id at 17 (stating that "even defenders of strong conscience laws acknowledge that these
protections cannot be absolute" in certain situations).
230. See id at21.
231. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-FaultCompensationfor Medical Injuries:
The Prospectfor Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 219 (2001) (considering no-fault compensation
systems, in which the plaintiff does not have to prove negligence, as compared to traditional malpractice

litigation).
232. See generally Sawicki, supra note 31.
233. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2018) (establishing that employers are not required
to provide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities where such accommodations
would "impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business"); id § 12113(b) (establishing that
"qualification standards" for employees may include a requirement that an employee shall "not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace"); id. § 2000e(j) (requiring that
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limitations on the right to individual accommodation-for example, in cases
where protection of the individual would result in undue hardship to an
employer.

Furthermore, as noted above, many state health care conscience laws
outside the reproductive context impose stricter conditions on the exercise of
conscience rights. Some state laws, for example, require providers who refuse
patient requests for medical interventions in end-of-life care contexts to provide
those interventions, in violation of their sincerely held beliefs, until the patient is
transferred. Reproductive health care conscience laws that allow refusing
providers to impose unilateral burdens on patients and employers seem very
much at odds with state and federal approaches in other contexts. Therefore, it is
of utmost importance to analyze whether there are sufficient policy justifications
for this distinctive treatment.
C.

Legal Challenges to Civil Immunity Provisions

Finally, there is an important opportunity for future research about the
constitutionality and legality of civil immunity provisions in health care
conscience laws. While many scholars have analyzed the constitutionality of
conscience laws generally, these analyses tend to focus on refusal provisions
from the perspective of patients' access to care. 234 There has been little academic

consideration, however, of whether granting refusing providers a right to
immunity from civil liability poses unique constitutional or other legal
challenges. 235 As noted in Part IILA, some courts have held that conscience laws
without explicit civil immunity provisions should not be construed broadly as
negating providers' obligation to comply with the standard of care. 236 That said,
some state constitutions include remedy provisions that protect plaintiffs from

employers "reasonably accommodate" a current or prospective employee's religious exercise, as long
as those accommodations do not impose an "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business"); 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j) (2018) (imposing a requirement that military conscientious objectors
who are opposed to war be assigned either to noncombatant service, or to civilian work in furtherance
of national health or safety).
234. See, e.g., Charo, supra note 63, at 126 (arguing that laws protecting providers who rely on
conscience protections to actively impose treatment against the will of a patient "run afoul of
constitutional protections for patient autonomy"); Michele Goodwin & Allison M. Whelan,
ConstitutionalExceptionalism, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1287, 1308 (arguing that conscience laws allowing
refusal of reproductive services impose undue burdens on women's constitutional rights); Harrington,
supra note 64, at 828-31 (arguing that recent state conscience laws likely do not violate the
Establishment Clause).
235. But see Rich, supra note 10, at 220 ("Holding healthcare providers legally accountable for
breaching a duty of care for reasons of religious conscience does not run counter to either the free
exercise or the establishment clauses of the U.S. Constitution.").
236. See California v. United States, No. C 05-00328 JSW, 2008 WL 744840, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2008) (declining to interpret the federal Weldon Amendment in a way that would protect
refusals that violate duties to treat under EMTALA).
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the abrogation of their common law rights. 237 Such state constitutional
guarantees might be relied upon to challenge statutory grants of civil immunity
for conscience-driven providers. Moreover, to the extent that federal laws, like
EMTALA, impose treatment obligations on health care providers, it may be
possible to challenge state civil immunity provisions as being preempted in cases
of emergency treatment. There may be other avenues for challenging civil
immunity provisions as well, and further exploration of these options is needed.

This Article presents the first comprehensive overview of the procedural
protections established by state conscience laws in the reproductive health care
context. The novel research findings in this Article raise awareness of the
previously unrecognized breadth of protections established by conscience laws.
These findings also challenge the assumption that tort law is available to remedy
harms suffered by patients who are injured by a conscience-based denial of
information or treatment, even when that denial violates the standard of care.
Although the scope of this study was limited to conscience laws relating to
reproductive care, it prompts further academic inquiry and debate about the
appropriate scope of conscience protections in all health care contexts. The data
and discussion in this Article should motivate policy-makers to consider how
best to balance providers' rights of conscience against the state's interest in
ensuring that patients, employers, and others who suffer harm as a result of a
provider's exercise of conscience rights are not denied legal remedies for those
harms.

&

237. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Am. Ass'n of Pro-Life Obstetricians
Gynecologists, 257 P.3d 181, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing Arizona's constitutional prohibition
on the "abrogation of . . actions in tort which trace origins to the common law" in the context of a legal
challenge to an abortion refusal law (citation omitted)).
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APPENDIX A:
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE CONSCIENCE LAWS
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9

(1) Cloning
(2) Stem cell research or treatment
(3) Research on gametes or embryos
(4) Assisted reproductive technology
(5) Medical use of fetal tissue
(6) Umbilical cord blood banking
(7) Genetic counseling

Prior versions held unconstitutional as applied to public hospitals in Valley Hosp. Ass n, Inc.
v. Mat-Su Coalitionfor Choice, 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997); Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d
523 (6th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976)

" Held unconstitutional as applied to "quasi-public" nonsectarian nonprofit hospitals in Doe v.
Bridgeton Hosp. Ass n, Inc., 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976)
"

Prior version held unconstitutional in Doe v. Rampton. 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973)
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APPENDIX B:
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN ABORTION CONSCIENCE LAWS

Alabama

Procedural Protections for PTnv iders
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution, Discrimination, Government
action, Education

Alaska

Civil liability

Arizona

None

Arkansas

Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Government action

California

Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Employment action, Education

Colorado *

n/a

Connecticut

None

Delaware

Civil liability, Disciplinary action

D.C. *

n/a

Florida

Civil liability, Disciplinary action

Georgia

Civil liability, Disciplinary action

Hawaii

Civil liability
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution,
Discrimination, Employment action,
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution,
Discrimination, Employment action,
licensure, Education, Funding

State

Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

Disciplinary action,
Government action
Disciplinary action,
Government action, State

Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment action, Education
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Government action, State licensure, Education
Civil liability, Discrimination, Employment action
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Government action, State licensure, Education, Funding
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution, Disciplinary action,
Discrimination, Employment action, Government action
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Government action, Education

Michigan

Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Government action
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Government action, Education, Funding
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution, Disciplinary action,
Discrimination, Employment action

Minnesota

Civil liability, Discrimination, Employment action

Maryland
Massachusetts

Mississippi *

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

n/a

Civil liability, Discrimination, Employment action, Government
action, Education, Funding
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Government action, Funding
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action
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State

?

Nevada

Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Employment action

New Hampshire *

dural Protetions for PrNne4rs

n/a

New Jersey

Civil liability, Criminal prosecution, Disciplinary action,
Discrimination

New Mexico

Disciplinary action

New York

Civil liability, Discrimination

North Carolina

Civil liability, Disciplinary action

North Dakota

Discrimination

Ohio

Civil liability, Disciplinary action
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, State licensure, Education

Oklahoma
Oregon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

Civil liability
Civil liability, Criminal prosecution, Disciplinary action,
Discrimination, Employment action, Government action, State
licensure, Education, Funding

South Carolina

Civil liability, Disciplinary action
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action

South Dakota

Civil liability, Employment action, Government action

Tennessee

None

Texas
Utah

Discrimination, Employment action, Education
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action

Vermont **

Government action

Virginia

Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Employment action

Washington

Discrimination, Employment action

West Virginia

None
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action, Education
Civil liability, Disciplinary action, Discrimination, Employment
action

Wisconsin
Wyoming

* No abortion conscience law
** No abortion refusal law; protects participating providers only
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C:

BENEFICIARIES OF CIVIL IMMUNITY IN ABORTION REFUSAL LAWS

Alabama

iny iieaii care proviucr, ry sician, ruariacisL, tCegisLereCu nurse, xVieiai
health professional, Student, Health care facility staff, Health care facility

Alaska

Any person, Health care facility

Arizona

None

Arkansas

Any person, Health care facility
Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Health care facility staff,
Religious health care facility

California
Colorado *

n/a

Connecticut

None

Delaware

Any person, Health care facility

D. C. *

n/a

Florida

Any person, Health care facility

Georgia

Any person, Pharmacist

Hawaii

Illinois

Any person, Health care facility
Any licensed professional, Physician, Registered nurse, Health care facilit
staff, Health care facility
Any person, Any health care provider, Physician, Registered nurse,
Student, Health care facility, Private health care facility

Indiana

None

Iowa

Any person

Kansas

Louisiana

Any person, Health care facility
Physician, Registered nurse, Public employee, Health care facility staff,
Private health care facility
Any person, Any health care provider, Physician, Registered nurse,
Student, Public employee, Health care facility staff, Health care facility

Maine

Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Health care facility

Maryland

Any person, Health care facility

Massachusetts
Michigan

Physician, Health care facility staff
Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Student, Health care facility staf
Health care facility

Minnesota

Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Health care facility

Mississippi *
Missouri

n/a
Physician, Registered nurse, Health care facility staff, Health care facility,
Private health care facility

Montana

Any person, Health care facility staff, Health care facility

Idaho

Kentucky

Nebraska

Any person, Health care facility

Nevada

Private health care facility

New Hampshire *

n/a

New Jersey

Any person, Health care facility
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New Mexico

None

New York

Any person, Health care facility

North Carolina

Any health care provider, Physician, Registered nurse

North Dakota

None

Ohio

Any person, Health care facility, Private health care facility
Any person, Physician, Pharmacist, Registered nurse, Health care facility
staff, Private health care facility

Oklahoma
Oregon

Pennsylvania

Health care facility
Any person, Any health care provider, Physician, Registered nurse,
Student, Health care facility staff, Health care facility, Private health care
facility

Rhode Island

Physician, Health care facility staff

South Carolina
South Dakota

Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Private health care facility
Any person, Physician, Registered nurse, Mental health professional,
Health care facility

Tennessee

None

Texas

None

Utah

Any health care provider, Health care facility staff, Health care facility

Vermont **

n/a

Virginia

Any person, Health care facility

Washington

None

West Virginia
Wisconsin

None
Any licensed professional, Registered nurse, Health care facility staff,
Health care facility

Wyoming

Any person, Private health care facility

* No abortion conscience law
** No abortion refusal law; protects participating providers only
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APPENDIX D:
PATIENT-PROTECTIVE
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Utah
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n/a
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* No abortion conscience law
** No abortion refusal law; protects participating providers only
(1) Rights limited in cases of ectopic pregnancy
(2) Patient must be referred to another provider
(3) Patient must be provided with information regarding access
(4) Provider must return patient's prescription
(5) Rights limited in cases of referral malpractice
(6) Provider must make informed consent disclosures
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